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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The verbs come and go, and their counterparts in other languages, are most commonly 
associated with a motion event, often with an implication of movement towards (“Come!”) or 
away from (“Go!”) the speaker. As a starting point this is ok, but it is also clearly 
insufficient, as many languages also utilize their forms of these verbs to encode a broader and 
more complex range of semantic information than simply a motion event through space, 
towards or away from the speaker. 
 
This study will examine the use of the Marathi verbs ja and ye (‘go’ and ‘come’, 
respectively), paying particular attention to usages that are semantically divergent from the 
basic spatial motion event. Cross-linguistically such ‘semantically divergent’ usages include 
renderings of a range of physical, mental and existential states. Furthermore, and again cross-
linguistically, evaluative connotations are often systematically encoded in the pair of verbs.  
 
In this thesis I show that the ‘basic’ senses of ja and ye support a diverse range of 
metaphorical usages and are surrounded by several metaphorically and metonymically 
‘extended’ senses. I also show that Marathi exhibits (as do Hindi, English and Thai) a 
figurative and evaluative systematization of its ‘go’ and ‘come’ verbs (ja and ye) with the 
contrastive notions of ‘bad’ and ‘good’ respectively.  
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The study integrates linguistic and cognitive linguistic work on subjectivity, prototypicality, 
metaphor, metonymy and image schemas to investigate the mechanisms and causes of the 
semantic changes leading to ja and ye’s current lexico-semantic situation.  
 
One of the main theoretical avenues in previous work on this topic has been deixis. Here too 
deixis will bear significantly on ja and ye, but my analysis will also reflect the shifting of 
theoretical ground that has occurred in the field of semantics since some of the earlier 
‘come’-and-‘go’ studies (e.g. Fillmore 1971). Specifically, I will expound polysemy to join 
deixis as the twin principal component of my theoretical framework, which together more 
comprehensively cover the processes and motivations for semantic shift of the kind we are 
looking at. 
 
Amongst the major questions that this study addresses are: 
• How can we define (cross-linguistic) ‘come’ and ‘go’, and (Marathi) ja and ye in their 
uses as verbs of motion through space? 
• What happens when ja and ye are used with some meaning other than these ‘basic’ 
meaning of spatial motion?  
• In such cases, what semantic forces are at play in allowing or constraining extension 
of the verbs’ meanings? What roles, for instance, are being played by the verbs’ 
deictic properties, or by the underlying mechanisms and causes of polysemy?  
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1.2 Marathi 
Marathi is an Indo-Aryan language spoken in the central western part of India, predominantly 
in the state of Maharashtra where it is an official language. It is bordered to the north and 
north-east by other Sanskrit-based languages, Gujarati and Hindi, and to the south-east and 
south by Dravidian languages Telugu and Kannada. Off the south-west corner of the Marathi 
speaking region lies Konkani, a closely related Indo-Aryan language.  
 
Marathi is spoken by about seventy percent of people in Maharashtra state, or seven percent 
of Indians, which amounts to approximately 70million people, and ranks as the fourth most-
spoken language in India (15th in the world). Addition of the global diaspora brings the total 
number of speakers up to over 80million. 
 
Being sandwiched between typologically distinct Indo-Aryan and Dravidian languages has 
had some interesting effects on the development of aspects of Marathi phonology, lexicon 
and syntax, where it displays some characteristic Dravidian features layered throughout its 
largely Sanskrit-derived base (Pandharipande 1997). Likewise, Marathi’s prominent position 
both within India and now in the global language economy has contributed to an abundance 
and diversity of sociolinguistic variation (Pandharipande 2003, Nemade 1990). About 45 
distinct dialects of Marathi are recognized, with many other regional varieties. Despite this, it 
is highly standardized thanks to Marathi-medium education and a proud (and highly 
politicized) ethno-linguistic identity (D’Souza 2006, Benei 2005). 
 
Marathi uses the devanagari alphabet (similarly to Hindi, Nepali and Sanskrit), employing 47 
individual characters (37 consonants and 10 vowels). 
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1.3 A note on translation.  
I am providing ‘go’ and ‘come’ as English translations of ja and ye, as well as of other 
‘equivalent’ lexical items in other languages. Neither ‘go’ nor ‘come’ are suitable candidates 
as either semantic primitives, nor as semantic universals (Goddard 1998:205-9, Goddard 
2001:28, Wilkins and Hill 1995). The analysis of ja and ye will show that their semantic 
distribution is, in their ‘basic’ senses as verbs of motion through space, similar to English go 
and come, although still not identical. In some of their less prototypical applications, however 
the English-Marathi counterparts are less comparable. Thus, ja and ye do not precisely mean 
‘go’ and ‘come’; all glosses should be thought of, especially in the finer details, as semantic 
approximations. Following Wilkins and Hill (1995) I will use (small caps) COME and GO 
when referring to an approximate semantic concept spanning a range of languages and their 
respective relevant lexical items. Note that I am not claiming the actual cross-linguistic 
existence of such linguistic (or underlying cognitive) structures; COME and GO are provided 
more as a procedural convenience. 
 
 
1.4 Thesis overview 
The remainder of the thesis is laid out as follows: 
 
Chapter two presents the theoretical framework to be used for the subsequent semantic 
analysis. Commencing with a synopsis of some of the overarching concepts, the main 
sections on deixis and polysemy are then followed by a methodological discussion on 
representing meaning including justification of the chosen metalanguage for the present 
analysis.  
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Chapter three utilizes this theoretical framework in a semantic analysis of the Marathi verbs 
ja and ye. Based on written and spoken language data it presents arguments for the 
development of different senses of the verbs, as well as exploring their use of ‘figurative’ 
deixis. 
 
Chapter four brings together the arguments and offers some Marathi-specific as well as some 
general theoretical conclusions on the themes. 
 
 
 9 
CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Prior to our semantic analysis of ja and ye we must review the concepts and theoretical tools 
that will be utilized. 
 
Cursory inspection of the data reveals a variety of uses of ja and ye. Central to the analysis 
will be a theory of polysemy, detailing the differentiation – or the integration – of these 
different ‘senses’. Polysemy’s mechanisms (metaphor and metonymy, and underlying these, 
image schemas) and causes (subjectivity, efficiency/expressivity) will be described. The 
other major component of the analysis will utilize the theory of linguistic deixis.  
 
Broadly, this theoretical framework pertains to the nexus of structural linguistics and 
pragmatics, bridging language ‘knowledge’ and language ‘usage’ (Chomsky 1986). The 
close interdependence of these levels of language use and theory is detailed below (section 
2.1.2). Whilst both polysemy and deixis are semantic theories, at a slightly finer level of 
distinction deixis has a somewhat more specific pragmatic element: In a theory of polysemy, 
ultimately a word’s meaning (or more correctly its sense in each usage), comprehended with 
the assistance of contextual information, can be glossed independently of the context – like 
dictionary definitions. The meaning of a deictic word, in contrast, (which has only one sense 
unless it is polysemous as well), relies directly in every case on the context of use.  
 
Thus, the theoretical themes are all contributions to our understanding of the complex 
relationships between words, their use, and therein their meanings.  
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 2.1.1 Subjectivity, Embodiment, Prototypicality 
Before commencing on deixis and polysemy, we will consider some key concepts that 
permeate the theoretical areas and form links between them: Subjectivity, embodiment and 
prototypicality. 
 
An appreciation of the significance of subjectivity must lie close to the heart of any theory of 
meaning. Subjectivity “involves the expression of self and the representation of a 
speaker’s… perspective or point of view in discourse”. (Traugott & Dasher 2002:20 quoting 
Finegan 1995:1). The inherent perspective of the speaker is a fundamental characteristic of 
much deictic language, as observed by Bühler ([1934] 1982) in his exposition of the ‘Origo’, 
the deictically situated a reference point of ‘me, here, now’. Indeed, according to Bühler it is 
precisely the subjective nature of deictic language that has been cited by the ‘ancient [Greek] 
grammarians’ and modern philosophers of language alike as complicating its logical and 
linguistic analysis. This conception of subjectivity aligns with Benveniste’s perspective that 
“c’est dans et par la langue que l’homme se constitue comme sujet; parce que la langue seul 
fonde en réalite, dans sa réalite qui est celle de l’être, le concept d’ ‘ego’”1 (Benveniste 
1966:259 quoted in Lyons 1982:101).  
 
Moreover, semantics in general is “irreducibly interpretive and subjective” (Riemer 
2005:417), as we each bring to our language use our own particular experiences and 
understandings. As such, in making claims about the ‘meanings’ of words or sentences, we 
are of course invoking an ‘idealized’ language user (Chomsky 1965); a certain shared 
                                                
1 It is in and through language that man constructs himself as subject; because language, in its human reality, 
founds the concept of ‘ego’. (translation mine). 
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standard of meaning as epitomized in the cumulative product of a language’s dictionary and 
grammar, vital to linguistic analysis but elusive in real linguistic practice. Thus we must 
acknowledge subjectivity’s capricious and powerful influence, and simultaneously, for 
practical reasons, downplay its significance in the hope of viewing more general (and less 
subjective) patterns of shared meaning. This analysis represents but one possible subjective 
interpretation of the data, but it also implicitly suggests that this interpretation reflects some 
recognizable shared meaning amongst Marathi speakers. Subjectivity will also be explored 
as a potential cause or motivation for meaning shift in language. 
 
Closely related to the notion of subjectivity is the effect embodied experience has on our 
linguistic systems and the underlying cognitive structures. These claims pertain to the 
cognitive linguistics approach, which looks explicitly for “language-mind and language-
mind-body linkages” in order to explain linguistic structure and behaviour (Gibbs 2006:90). 
The notion of embodiment then, like subjectivity, presents a functionalist account of the 
development of meanings. 
 
Levinson (2003) observes the embodied nature of spatial perception and the explanatory 
power of semantic and pragmatic extension from this embodied understanding of space, 
whilst Gibbs (2006) explains that we conceptualize our sensory perceptions into general and 
extendable models of forces and phenomena – image schemas (cf. section 2.3.1), through 
which subsequent experiences may be conceptually filtered and understood. Being a 
cognitive model these image schemas can only be indirectly observed through such things as 
language and behaviour, and accordingly they are suggested as providing the underlying 
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structure to linguistic devices such as metaphor. The relevant cognitive linguistic theories – 
metaphor, metonymy and image schemas – will be more fully introduced later in this chapter.  
 
Finally, the influential concept of prototypes pervades many aspects of this study. The 
prototypical understanding of categorization for which there is compelling evidence 
(Fillmore 1982:33), arose from the psycholinguistic work in the 1970s of Eleanor Rosch and 
was one of the significant advances that heralded the subsequent explosion of cognitive 
linguistic research (e.g. Lakoff et al’s work on metaphor). The basic premise (Geeraerts 
1997:11) is that categories: 
 
(i) …exhibit degress of typicality; not every member is equally representative for a 
category. 
(ii) …exhibit a family resemblance structure, or more generally, their semantic 
structure takes the form of a radial set of clustered and overlapping readings. 
(iii) …are blurred at the edges. 
(iv) …cannot be defined by means of a single set of criterial (necessary and 
sufficient) attributes.  
 
We will observe various permutations of these properties in the organization of the 
senses of ja and ye, and in shaping the senses’ development. One reason why 
prototypicality is so inherently useful in the study of semantic change is because of its 
fundamental flexibility, which imbues it even as a static and synchronic theory of 
categorial structure with a highly dynamic nature (Geeraerts 1997:114). 
 
These overarching themes – subjectivity, embodiment and prototypicality – will be referred 
to at numerous relevant points throughout the remainder of the study. 
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 2.1.2 Semantics and pragmatics  
As a semantic analysis this study will largely ignore issues of pragmatics. We will focus on 
only the explicitly encoded information, avoiding tacit communicative devices such as 
implicatures. Our data, however, are language in use: Where context-specific pragmatic 
pressures have already inevitably impacted on ‘decontextualised’ semantic information (such 
as our internal generalized ‘dictionary-like’ definitions of words). Despite this, polysemy by 
definition pertains to the initial level of semantic information (i.e. prior to pragmatics). So 
even though the data do display the effects of pragmatic pressures, our approach is to simply 
accept these at face value, and to focus on the subsumed semantic level of “stored 
communicable information associated with conventional signs” (Wilkins and Hill 1995:213). 
In general, therefore, we will assume that besides what is made explicit or is immediately 
contextually apparent, the context and other pragmatic effects are maximally simple. For 
instance, if someone is ‘going’ but their destination is not mentioned we will assume that 
none is implied. 
  
2.1.3 Diachronicity in semantic change studies 
Studies of semantic change often adopt a diachronic approach, using data spanning an 
extended period of time. This is, of course, appropriate for viewing unfolding stages of 
change. A synchronic data set, however, is also capable of showing (at least certain types of) 
semantic change. Specifically, when a word’s meaning shifts by becoming systematically 
(semantically) used divergently to its original meaning, but the original meaning does not 
disappear, the resulting situation is a word with two distinct meanings – historically 
(etymologically) related, but both simultaneously ‘current’. This situation, called polysemy, 
will be discussed in section 2.3. Accordingly, whilst diachronic data is certainly useful, it is 
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not absolutely crucial. The present study unfortunately lacks the space to include a wider, 
diachronic range of data, but is nevertheless justified in providing an account of diachronic 
semantic shift based on synchronic data. 
  
 
2.2 Deixis 
Deictic language is that which may only be fully and correctly “interpreted by knowing 
certain aspects of the communication act in which the utterances” occurred (Fillmore 
1971:39). In this way it contrasts with language that is non-indexical in the sense that each 
word can be sufficiently understood by its standard semantic content (say, dictionary 
definition), and that the sentence in turn can be deciphered according to a set of standard 
decontextualized syntactic and semantic rules. Although such non-deictic language exists 
widely (such as in gnomic statements, e.g. “Cats are stealthy”), deixis is also prolific. The 
meanings of verbs like come and go rely on deixis because their definition in a given usage 
includes a place which is relative to some discourse relevant person, usually the speaker or 
the addressee; this will be discussed more below. 
 
Essentially then, deixis requires contextualization to provide or recover its complete 
meaning, thus connecting language and the world in a manner sensitive to the situational 
details of the particular linguistic act in which it occurs. Deictic language may be anchored to 
the context through a number of different channels, including (summarized from Fillmore 
1971:39-40): 
• The identity of the interlocutors, person deixis (eg. Personal pronouns, which refer to 
different people depending on who utters them and/or hears them.) 
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• The place/s in which the conversation participants are located, or some other place 
relevant to the discourse: place deixis (eg. Demonstratives like ‘here’ and ‘there’, which 
refer to different places depending on the location of the speaker and possibly the 
addressee.) 
• The time at which the communication act takes place, or in the case of non-synchronic 
communication such as letter, when it is produced or received: time deixis (eg. Time 
expressions like ‘tomorrow’, ‘now’, ‘later’, ‘before’ etc. whose meaning is clearly 
dependent on some implicitly shared reference time, or tense and aspect markers which 
temporally situate the discourse and the event within the discourse.)  
• Preceding and following parts of the discourse: discourse deixis (eg. Anaphorically 
functioning words like ‘this’ or ‘that’ when they refer to some previously made point.) 
• Social relationships of the interlocutors or others: social deixis (eg. Respect forms of 
address like ‘Sir’, or honorifics.) 
 
As this overview illustrates, deixis is of great and varied significance within linguistic 
communication. It endows language with an efficient means of referring to the immediate 
context, thus catering elegantly to language’s most frequent application as a practical tool for 
interacting with others in order to manipulate the environment, including other people.  
 
The variety of channels through which deictic language may be anchored to its context are 
consolidated by one very common default, communally understood deictic reference point, 
the deictic centre, which is roughly: ‘me, here, now, at this point in the discourse, in my 
social position’ (Fillmore 1971). Once this centre has been located (usually implicitly) by the 
speaker, it can serve as a zero point for a more extensive system of relative coordinates or 
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directions - left, right, north, south etc. of here. (cf. Bühler 1934 Origo; and Fillmore 1982:45 
on speaker ‘grounding’), and which an addressee who is appropriately linguistically and 
culturally conversant will be able to decode. Deictic centering is highly significant in an 
analysis of any deictic language, including COME and GO. The default deictic centre, needless 
to say, is the mode par excellence of expressing our subjectivity (Lyons 1982). 
 
Whilst for practical and phenomenological reasons the deictic centre often remains 
egocentrically located, it can also be shifted by the speaker to suit his pragmatic needs or 
preferences. We shall see such shifting of the deictic centre in the following discussion on the 
deixis of COME and GO.  
 
2.2.1 Deixis in COME and GO as verbs of motion through space 
We have so far introduced deixis and glimpsed its importance in linguistic practice. One 
aspect of deixis that has been examined is its role in the semantic structure of certain verbs of 
motion like COME and GO. From this point forward we will adopt Talmy’s (1985) descriptive 
notation of typical verbs of motion: An object of some kind (the Figure) moves along a 
trajectory (the Path), away from one point (Source) and simultaneously towards another 
(Goal). Both the Source and the Goal are subcategorized as specific parts of the Ground, 
reference points against which the motion happens. The Path, being essentially a series of 
adjacent points between the Source and Goal, is also technically just a specific part of the 
Ground. So, reduced, motion involves a Figure and a Ground, the latter subspecified into 
Source, Path, and Goal (cf. SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image schema, section  2.3.1) 
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Deictic centering, as explained, occurs when the speaker (or more precisely some aspect of 
her utterance) utilizes a contextually referential anchoring point, often (but by no means 
always) ‘me, here, now’. Deictic centering is clearly relevant in English come and go as can 
be seen in these dictionary definitions: 
 
come: (1) move or travel towards or into a place near or familiar to the speaker (Concise 
OED 11thEd.); 
 
go: “(where) the prominent notion is that of destination or direction… the verb is 
distinguished from come by the implication that the movement is not towards the speaker, or 
the person whose point of view he for the moment assumes” (OED, quoted in Fillmore 
1971:51) 
 
These definitions suggest a relatively consistent spatial deictic centre for come and go in the 
location of the speaker. Or do they? Certainly, the deictic anchoring of come is made quite 
explicit, but go’s deictic properties seem dependent on being understood in opposition to 
come, rather than inherent. Such an interpretation is proposed by Wilkins and Hill (1995), 
along with the observation that an intrinsic semantic opposition between COME and GO has 
often been assumed but is not necessarily the case, especially outside of English. Staying for 
now with English, and the more clearly deictically anchored come, it is apparent that come’s 
deictic centre cannot simply be identifying with the location of the speaker:  
 
“May I come in [to the house, i.e. towards you, the addressee]?” 
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“I came to the front door [where I expected you, the addressee, to be, but you actually 
were not; you may have been there earlier but were not necessarily], but you were not 
there.” 
 
In these examples the deictic centre has been shifted to the addressee’s location, either actual 
or, as in the second example, potential, past or imagined.  
 
Upon examination, Fillmore (1971:50) concludes that go indicates motion towards 
somewhere other than the speaker’s location at ‘coding time’. (‘Coding time’ is the time at 
which the communication act occurs. In contrast is ‘reference time’ which is “the temporal 
focus or background for the event or condition being described in the clause” [Fillmore 
1971:52-54]). It is the Goal of go, then, which is deictically defined negatively as a place 
where the speaker is not. 
 
Come, for its part, must be more volubly defined (Fillmore 1971): 
 
motion toward the location of either the speaker or the addressee at either coding 
time or reference time [see note]… [or] motion at reference time which is in the 
company of either the speaker or addressee… [or] in discourse in which neither the 
speaker nor addressee figure as a character, motion toward a place taken as the 
subject of the narrative, toward the location of the central character at reference time, 
or toward the place which is the central character’s home base at reference time.  
 
This definition identifies nine possible locations for come’s deictic centre: six when the 
speaker and/or addressee ‘figure as characters’ in the discourse, and three when neither of 
them figure as such. More generally the definitions contend that both come and go are, in 
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fact, deictic terms, as their meaning in a given usage is dependent on the context – 
specifically, the location of the speaker or some other discourse-relevant person.  
 
All potentially semantically contributing in a given use of come or go, then, are:  
• the location of the Source or Goal (place deixis);  
• who is speaking/being spoken to and who is accompanying them (person deixis);  
• who else is or isn’t present in the discourse (discourse deixis);  
• the relationship between coding time and reference time (time deixis).  
 
The difference between come as motion towards a deictically specified Goal, and go as 
motion towards a negatively deictically specified Goal (i.e. deictically specifying a point and 
then stipulating movement to some other point) suggests (i) that come may be a ‘more 
deictic’ verb than go because come’s meaning is more dependent on an actual deictically 
specified location and (ii) that the meaning of come is intrinsically Goal-related.  
 
Whether go, for its part, is more semantically associated with the Source or Goal is less clear-
cut. Fillmore defined go with respect to a Goal, but it is a negatively deictically specified 
Goal. Such a negatively defined location clearly represents a more complicated semantic 
relationship between place and motion, but precisely what effects this has will, at this stage, 
remain open for discussion. Also on this point we might compare some NSM explications of 
the English motion verb pair (metalanguages are discussed in section 2.4). Interestingly – and 
this will be explored more later through ja and ye, Goddard (1998:205) provides a separate 
explication for when a to-phrase is added to go, pointing out that in this syntactic context “X 
went from A to B entails X moved from A to B”:  
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go: 
X went (yesterday)= 
before this, X was somewhere 
X wanted to be somewhere else 
because of this, X moved for some time (yesterday) 
because of this, after this X wasn’t in this place any more 
X was somewhere else 
 
go with a to-phrase: 
X went from A to B (yesterday)= 
before this, X was in place-A 
X wanted to be somewhere else 
because of this, X moved for some time (yesterday) 
because of this, after this X wasn’t in place-A any more 
X was in place-B 
 
come: 
X came to place-A (yesterday)= 
before this, X was somewhere 
X wanted to be somewhere else  
because of this, X moved for some time 
because of this, after this X was in place (place-A) (yesterday) 
someone in this place could think: 
 X is in the same place as me 
 
The explication for come is identical to go in the first three components, “which is as it 
should be considering that an act of coming can be seen (from another point of view) as an 
act of going.” (Goddard 1998:210). The differences thereafter attest to (i) the different 
temporal perspectives on the motion itself: Motion is a prior condition for coming, whereas 
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motion is an outcome of going. And, more significantly, (ii) “the possibility of an 
‘egocentric’ interpretation of X’s final location”, encoded in the final two lines which 
provide “the special quality of come” (Goddard 1998:210). Note that this ‘egocentric’ 
perspective can be that of the speaker, addressee or a third party, and (‘someone in this place 
could think’) can even express a “hypothetical or imagined” situation (Goddard 1998:211). 
 
Upon this grounding the deictic properties of ja and ye will be examined in chapter three.  
 
To conclude this section, and of significance for the present study, there is a considerable 
degree of cross-linguistic variation in the deictic referencing properties of COME and GO 
(Fillmore 1971:68-69; Wilkins & Hill 1995; Wälchli 2006; Ricca 1993; Goddard 1998:205-
9). Mazahua, for instance, makes use of social deixis, (the only type of deixis not encoded in 
English come and go), by allowing the deictic centre to be shifted to the addressee only when 
used in “polite or deferential language”, thus referencing some aspect of the social 
relationship between speaker and addressee (Fillmore 1971:69). Whilst Ricca (1993, cited in 
Koptjevskaja-Tamm 2008:17) concludes from her study of 20 European languages that COME 
is a deictic verb but GO is non-deictic. 
 
The deictic properties of COME and GO that we have so far been discussing have largely to do 
with spatial reference – locations and direction of movement. We shall see below that COME 
and GO often refer to events other than direction of movement through space. But first, as 
space does appear to be of some importance, we will review the theoretical area of space in 
language. 
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2.2.2 Space in language 
Our experiential acquaintance with space provides an abundant stimulus for much language. 
Many grammatical constructions including temporal and aspectual, existential, change-of-
state and causal expressions are directly or metaphorically couched in locative language 
grounded in ‘spatial notions’, and “[p]sychologists have suggested that these ‘localist’ 
tendencies may reflect the evolution of language out of spatial cognition.” (Levinson 
2003:17). Space’s “primacy” may be cross-linguistically observed in “the fact that spatial 
relations often carry core conceptual content, as manifested by their expression in closed-
class forms, and from metaphorical use of spatial relations throughout other parts of the 
semantic system” (Regier 1996:20). 
 
Cultural variability in spatial conception is widely attested on the basis of cross-linguistic 
evidence. Specifically, variable ‘frames of reference’ (intrinsic, relative, absolute) reflect a 
range of possible conceptions of space and movement, as well as of many other related facets 
of cognition (Levinson 2003). A deictic centre is not in itself a frame of reference; rather, it 
provides an origin to which a frame of reference may be anchored (Levinson 2003:70-71; cf. 
Bühler on ‘Origo’ and Fillmore 1982:45 on speaker ‘grounding’).  
 
The grounding of many cognitive and linguistic structures in ‘spatial notions’ is an assertion 
about embodied experience, as we only understand the abstract entity ‘space’ indirectly, as it 
is filtered through our sensory perceptions, and our linguistic and cultural models. 
Furthermore, the claim that space is cognitively primordial, underlying and mapping onto 
other domains of experience and abstract concepts, relates to several other key (and 
themselves interrelated) concepts in the present study: The idea of central vs. peripheral 
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meanings and its foundation in prototypicality; theories of polysemy; and in the 
literal/figurative meaning distinction briefly mentioned above. Specifically, the implication is 
that more prototypical meanings, more primary senses (in polysemy), and what are perceived 
to be more ‘literal’ meanings lie semantically closer to the claimed cognitive prime – space.  
 
Also the focus of much semantic interpretation is another experientially comprehended 
abstract concept – time. Some analyses suggest that our understanding of space is somehow 
more primal than our understanding of time, such as Lakoff’s (1993) TIME PASSING IS MOTION 
conceptual metaphor. But this is merely a theoretical extension of the more cautious 
observation that aspects of spatial and temporal language are “structurally similar”, which 
does not necessarily entail that one stems metaphorically from the other (McClone 
2001:103). An equally reasonable explanation is that aspects of our interaction with space 
may lead to a more “transparent” expression of a “common set of abstract principles” 
organizing our experiences of space, time and other abstract concepts (McGlone 2001:103 
citing Jackendoff 1983, Gruber 1976 and Talmy 1996). The linguistic manifestations could 
(and often do) mislead us to infer that space is more cognitively real or fundamental. 
Although McGlone does not expand on this ‘common set of abstract organizing principles’, it 
appears functionally analogous to image schemas (cf. section 2.3.1). More generally, 
Kovecses (2006:212) suggests that ‘conceptual space’ is structured by our embodied 
experience of physical space. Accordingly, naming (supposed) conceptual mappings between 
these domains ‘metaphors’ is perhaps overstating the case. (Or, on the other hand, this is a 
prototypical exemplar of ‘metaphor’. This is precisely the problem with trying to define 
metaphor at a conceptual level – where does metaphor end and embodied thinking begin?) 
That native English speakers generally agree, for instance, that long is more basically a 
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spatial descriptor, and only derivatively a temporal one need not be interpreted as that space 
is cognitively prior to time, but is more soberly interpreted (by Fillmore 1982:32-33) as a 
prototype effect within that particular word. 
 
This discussion is relevant because COME and GO, as verbs of motion, also implicitly encode 
movement through time. Change, in this case of a Figure’s location, is inherently temporally 
grounded. This fundamental relationship between spatial motion and temporal ‘motion’ no 
doubt contributes to the impression of conceptual and linguistic mapping between the two 
semantic domains (cf. Hoyt 1994, Gibbs 2006:187-190). 
 
2.2.3 ‘Figurative’ deixis in COME and GO 
So far, the deictic properties of COME and GO have been discussed in the context of 
movement through space. But these verbs are also used for a variety of other distinct 
semantic purposes. In a number of studies in various languages, COME and GO are seen to 
refer to a range of much more abstract events, such as the arrival, departure or occurrence of 
certain mental or physical states, or the occurrence of other (non-personal) events, none of 
which seem to involve any notion of spatial motion at all. Clarke (1974) suggests that these 
uses of COME and GO should be thought of as less ‘literal’ and more ‘figurative’. This claim 
will be further examined below, but for the sake of the current discussion, the 
literal/figurative dichotomy will be observed. Even though these figurative uses of COME and 
GO occur in a broad range of semantic environments, and without clear person, place or time 
deictic anchoring points, the concept of deictic centre still contributes crucially to their 
meaning.  
 
 25 
The observed tendency is for COME to indicate states or events which are favorable, or which 
are generally considered ‘normal’. GO, in its turn, fulfills the reverse semantic roles, referring 
to things which are unfavorable, or which are considered departures from ‘normal’. This 
contrast will here be simplified to ‘good’ (COME) vs. ‘bad’ (GO). The vital point is that deictic 
centre is still utilized, but it is ‘located’ at the figurative location of ‘good’, which events or 
states described with COME ‘approach’, ‘arrive at’ or simply ‘are at’. Conversely, events or 
states described with GO ‘depart’, ‘move away from’ or ‘are not at’ the deictic center 
(‘good’). With regards to what constitutes ‘normal’ and ‘favorable’ (here ‘good’), Clarke 
(1974:316) suggests such things as sanity, consciousness, and socially accepted/expected 
behaviour, but acknowledges the likelihood of some cultural variation. Following are some 
illustrative examples from the studies whose findings have supported the above hypothesis. 
Sinha (1972) analysed ana (COME) and jana (GO) in Hindi, Clarke (1974) come and go in 
English, and Treerat (1990) ma: (COME) and pay (GO) in Thai. (The examples below are 
either from Clarke [English examples], Sinha [Hindi] or Treerat [Thai]). 
 
• When something COMES it is good: 
 
English: 
I came up with the answer/idea/solution.  
We came to an agreement.  
She came into some money. 
All of my dreams came true.  
He came good in the end. 
She came to/around (i.e. returned to consciousness)/out of a coma. 
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Hindi: 
uska larka layak/yogya/widwannidar/bhadra/bhala nikal aya  
his son able/a scholar/fearless/gentle/noble out came  
His son turned out to be able/a scholar/fearless/gentle/noble. 
 
musiibat me uskii buddhi nikal aayii 
crisis in his wisdom out came 
In crisis his wisdom came out. 
 
ciijo ke daam niice utar aaye 
things Poss. price down Obl. came 
The price of things came down. 
 
Thai: 
khǎw  tù:n ma: dûay cìtcay thî: caè:msǎy 
He awake come with  mind that glow 
He woke up feeling bright 
 
pho’: khǎw fú’:n ma: kó’ hěn phû:khon ra:yló’:m khǎw yù: 
when he regain 
consciousness 
come then see people surround he Asp. 
As he came back to his senses he found that he was surrounded by people. 
 
• When something GOES it is bad: 
 
English: 
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A situation or thing goes/*comes bad. 
Food goes/*comes stale/sour/off.  
Metal goes/*comes rusty. 
A person goes/*comes bald/deaf/blind/into a coma.  
 
Hindi: 
uska larka bewkuf/badmas/xarab/haramzada nikal gaya  
his son fool/rascal/bad/bastard out went  
His son turned out to be (Lit: went out) a fool/rascal/bastard/bad. 
 
musiibat me uskii buddhi nikal gayii  
crisis in his wisdom out went  
In crisis his wisdom went/left him. 
 
ciijo ke daam upar carh gaye  
things Poss. price up Obl. went  
The price of things went up. 
 
Thai: 
hà:k khô’:sanǒe: ní: tòk pay phǒm cà sǐacay mâ:k 
if proposal this reject go I will sad very 
I will be very unhappy if this proposal is rejected. 
 
fay yù: yù: kó’ dàp pay 
power without any cause Conj extinguish go 
The power went out without any reason. 
 
khǎw ta:y pay yà:ng ráy yâ:t mît 
he die go Adv without relative friend 
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He died without any friends and relatives. 
 
phû:tca: hây sùpâ:p dǐaw cà kla:y pen khon ráy ma:ra:yâ:t pay 
speak give polite other-
wise 
will change be people without manner go 
  Speak politely otherwise it will be considered bad manners. 
 
Overall the three studies arrive at similar conclusions regarding the ‘good’ deictic centre of 
COME and GO when used in figurative ways.  
 
The encoding of an evaluative standard in COME and GO as seen in this section is clearly an 
expression of subjectivity, presenting the perspective or opinion of, usually, the speaker, but 
also, as in the final Thai (‘social standard’) example, the subjectively projected ‘population in 
general’.  
 
As was mentioned at the start of this section, many of the examples have little or no semantic 
relationship to ‘literal’ movement through space. But what (nearly) all of them do contain is 
motion through time. As discussed above, this is because COMING and GOING, whether literal 
or figurative, are inchoative verbs that refer to a change in state, which is inevitably extended 
through time. It is therefore suggested that motion, of a more elementary kind than spatial 
motion, is central to the inherent meaning of COME and GO, and hence remains even in their 
semantic extension into figurative senses.  
 
In revealing the range of meanings COME and GO can encode, this discussion introduces the 
second major theoretical area, polysemy. 
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2.3 Polysemy 
Polysemy is the development over time of a range of meanings, called senses, attached to a 
single lexical item. This section outlines the mechanisms and causes of polysemy, and 
specifically those that are applicable to this study. Afterwards, in applying the concepts in an 
analysis of ja and ye we hope to trace semantic threads through their different senses and 
perhaps arrive at their (individual or common) semantic ‘core’. That is not to suggest, 
however, that any single thread or core needs to pervade all of a word’s senses. Recall from 
the start of the chapter the characteristics of prototype style categories, any of which could be 
sought and (reasonably) expected within the readily identifiable category of a word’s set of 
senses. Accordingly, we may seek the most crucial features of the best prototype of a word or 
sense. The more of such features that a given example fulfills, the closer it is to the 
prototypical category member. Thus, some senses are more central, whilst others are more 
peripheral. This (along with other features of prototype categories) entails that different 
senses, and different semantic components of different senses, have varying levels of 
structural importance within the overall semantic topography of the lexical item with its 
varied senses (Geeraerts 1997:21).  
 
Before proceeding to the mechanisms and causes of polysemy, we must briefly discuss 
possible tests for polysemy and the related topic of generality. Firstly, ‘generality’ means that 
a word does not encode one way or the other a potential definition-internal distinction: 
Whilst in its general definition it includes both sides of the distinction, in a particular context 
it may refer specifically to one or the other of the alternatives (Goddard 1998:19). For 
example, in many languages one lexical item covers the arm and the hand (Koptjevskaka-
Tamm 2008:19 citing Brown 2005). In such languages, this lexical item is ‘general’ 
 30 
regarding the hand/arm distinction. (Speakers of these languages can, if they need to, of 
course refer to the hand and arm individually through other means, but the distinction is just 
not lexicalised at this same level that we are accustomed to in English). In particular contexts 
this ‘general’ (hand/arm) lexical item may refer to either the hand or the arm individually. 
This does not mean, however, that the lexical item is polysemous, with one sense meaning 
‘hand’ and the other meaning ‘arm’. Instead its relationship with the alternate referents is 
called ‘general’. This subtle distinction hints at the inherent uncertainty (or just subjective 
variability) as to whether a usage or set of usages constitute a distinct sense or not. Which 
brings us to testing for polysemy. 
 
Many tests for polysemy have been proposed including logical, syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic types (for details see Riemer 2005:133-48). Ultimately, however, none of these 
tests (individually or in combination) can guarantee a definitive judgement on the question of 
the polysemy (or not) of a given lexical item. This failing reflects (i) the inherently complex 
nature of meaning, (ii) the (already observed) ultimate subjectivity of any analysis, and (iii) 
the fact that we have no clear “pre-theoretical notion of what a distinct meaning [i.e. sense] 
is...” and so our search for criteria to distinguish between senses will inevitably be 
“...hampered by the fact that we do not know precisely what it is we want a criterion for” 
(Geeraerts 2006: 136). In response to this complexity, the following analysis of ja and ye’s 
various uses and senses consciously expounds multifaceted arguments.  
 
Having observed various uses of COME and GO, possibly (but not necessarily) reflecting 
multiple senses, we are interested to ask: Are there semantic features which pertain to all 
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uses of COME (or GO)? If so, is there amongst them one (or perhaps several) key features 
which define a core meaning of COME (and, separately, GO)? 
 
As previously mentioned, we would posit a shared core feature of movement (minimally 
through time and frequently through space and time). And additionally, for COME, a 
deictically specified Goal (which of course depends on the language specific deictic 
projection properties). GO’s locational aspect may require a more complex definition 
depending on the particular syntactic environment such as specification (or not) of a Source 
or Goal, but a general restriction might be that the Goal may not be the location of the 
speaker at coding time. In both cases we have observed that the deictic centre – which recall 
provides a reference point for the Source and Goal, may be defined either literally or 
figuratively.  
 
Motivated by our prototype approach to meaning, we might further wonder which movement 
(through space or time), and which deictic centre (literal or figurative) define the more 
prototypical COME and GO. For now these questions will be left aside, but their insinuation 
that the semantic structures of words are “networks of semantic concepts that are extendible 
from a core meaning” (Ravin and Leacock 2000:5) leads us back to the mechanisms and 
causes of these processes of semantic ‘extension’, to which we will now turn. 
 
2.3.1 Mechanisms: Metaphor and metonymy 
This subsection outlines two of the most commonly observed mechanisms leading to 
polysemy, metaphor and metonymy. Before this, though, we will look very briefly at another 
pair, pejorative and ameliorative change. Pejorative and ameliorative change is when 
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meaning shifts to encode inherent ‘bad’ or ‘good’ connotations (Geeraerts 1997:93-102). 
This type of change was (or perhaps will eventually be) a semantic component of many of 
the figurative senses of COME and GO discussed above. Their meanings in context do not 
solely amount to a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ connotation, but this is certainly in some respect one part 
of their new ‘extended’ meaning. To illustrate, the following two examples consist solely of 
the words come and go yet still convey good and bad respective connotations: When 
someone is uncontrollably drunk (‘bad’) we say they are “gone”; and to experience sexual 
orgasm (‘good’) is to “come”. 
 
Returning now to metaphor and metonymy. Whilst in some respects these two concepts can 
be suitably defined and distinguished from one another, there is also a significant degree of 
crossover and interplay between the two. This exists both at a theoretical (i.e. definitional and 
conceptual) level, and more practically in seeking to identify their linguistic presence and 
effects. This ‘problem of demarcation’ (Riemer 2005) arises in part because the “the target 
and/or the source [of a metaphor] must be understood or perspectivized metonymyically for 
the metaphor to be possible’” (Barcelona 2000:31 italics original). In other words, for a 
mapping to be based on semantic similarity (metaphor), there must be some sense of 
semantic contiguity (metonymy). And vice versa, if two domains are contiguous with one 
another, they evidently also share some semantic similarities. Note that both ‘semantic 
similarity’ and ‘semantic contiguity’ are delineated according to culture-specific 
conventional practice; they are neither universal nor subjectively arbitrary. Even if we do 
accept a theoretical division, researchers have observed (e.g. Riemer 2005, Traugott & 
Dasher 2002), and the present study will likewise discern, that the two mechanisms often co-
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occur in one semantic shift, with the concomitant complication of whether they occur 
simultaneously, or if one precedes the other. 
 
These ‘demarcation’ issues aside, metaphor and metonymy are commonly defined along the 
following lines:  
 
Metaphor is a mapping of some quality or qualities from one semantic domain (the source 
domain) to another (the target). E.g. (from Glucksberg 2001):  
 
‘My lawyer is a shark.’  
 
This statement takes the sharks’ qualities of aggressiveness and ruthless efficiency in what 
they do, and applies them to ‘my lawyer’. Lawyers and sharks would generally (to my mind 
at least) be accepted as belonging to distinct semantic domains (‘professionals’ and ‘marine 
life’, say). We will come back to metaphor after looking at metonymy. 
 
Metonymy is a mapping between structurally adjacent semantic domains, which are in fact 
part of the same broader semantic domain. This is linguistically realized (loosely) in  a 
‘stand-for’ relation; ‘x stands for y’ (Kovecses 2006:97). E.g. (from Kovecses 2006): 
 
‘Washington denied the charges.’  
 
A place (Washington) which is systematically associated with the activities that occur there 
(governing America), is standing for one of the people who are known to engage in those 
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activities, a politician who is a member of the United States government. It is this politician 
who actually ‘denied the charges’. The connection between the politician and Washington is 
based on a chain of principled semantic affiliations, but that politician and Washington are 
also part of the same broad semantic domain of ‘The United States Government’. 
 
The notion of metonymy is indispensable to the present study. COME and GO terms (like ye 
and ja), often being verbs and specifically inchoative verbs, semantically encode events 
(Croft 1990). Events can be viewed in their entirety, or they can be divided up into stages or 
constituents comprising the overall event. A translational motion event, for instance, could be 
portrayed as containing the following constituents: 
 
1.An object is at a location. 
2.The object departs from the location.  
3.It moves along a trajectory through space.   
4.It arrives at another location.   
5.The object is at this second location. 
 
This is essentially a restatement of the ‘basic motion event’ introduced above with its 
associated terminology (Figure, Path, Source, Goal, Ground). Each of these constituents has 
an obvious principled connection with each of the other constituents, and they 
simultaneously are congregated within the broader domain of ‘translational motion events’. 
Thus one or several of the constituents might be used to stand for others, or for the motion 
event in general. Or, conversely, the motion event could be used to stand for one or several 
particular constituents. Regarding its analytical capacity for this study, this ‘constituency’ 
concept will be re-presented below (section 2.4). 
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As traced above in the discussions of ‘figurative’ deixis in COME and GO, and the language of 
time and space, metaphor is another mechanism that may offer an account of the semantic 
development of these verbs. We briefly defined metaphor above, and now we will continue 
to a more in depth examination of the trope.  
 
One influential claim is that metaphors in language are but a surface expression of an 
underlying cognitive structure and/or process, called ‘conceptual metaphor’ (Lakoff & 
Johnson 1980). The precise nature of conceptual metaphors’ theoretical claim, however, 
needs to be explicit as their putative elements (sources or targets) are often demonstrably 
neither semantically universal nor primitive (Goddard 2008). Take, for instance, the proposed 
conceptual metaphor THE MIND IS THE BODY. BODY is a universally lexicalized concept, and 
semantically ‘simple’; MIND, on the other hand, is “semantically complex and exquisitely 
culture-bound” (Goddard 2008:94). This argument legitimately attacks universal conceptual 
metaphors, but it does not preclude the positing of culture/language specific conceptual 
metaphors. Accordingly, any posited metaphor in this study is intended solely as an 
observation of linguistic metaphor, and only with reference to Marathi. I will neither assert 
nor refute conceptual metaphors, rather I will observe instances and broader patterns of 
linguistic metaphor, not extending the discussion to whether or not these reflect underlying 
conceptual metaphors. 
 
Looking beyond this debate, conceptual metaphors are posited largely on the basis of general 
patterns of linguistically observed metaphor. Several are of obvious significance to the 
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present study, including (all from McGlone 2001 citing Lakoff 1987, 1993, Lakoff & 
Johnson 1977, 1980):  
 
• TIME PASSING IS MOTION. Cf. discussions above on spatial/temporal connections both 
generally and for motion verbs. 
• DEATH IS DEPARTURE. Departure is one constituent of the ‘basic motion event’ (cf.  section 
2.4) encompassing both COME and GO. 
• THE MIND IS A CONTAINER (more generally ‘the CONDUIT metaphor’). Once the mind is a 
container, it can then be a physical location (e.g. a Source or Goal).  
• HAPPY IS UP, HAVING CONTROL IS UP; SAD IS DOWN, BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL IS DOWN. 
‘Up’ and ‘down’ could be directions of COMING or GOING movement. Also ‘happy vs. sad’ 
and ‘having control vs. being subject to control’ bear obvious relationship to COME and 
GO’s figurative deictic center (‘good’). 
 
It must be remembered that these conceptual metaphors have been drawn from English. 
Whilst we should certainly expect cross-cultural variation they are nevertheless a useful 
starting point, especially as explanations of them are often in terms of embodied experience. 
Embodiment is also highly culturally variable, but it nonetheless includes at least one 
relatively universal element, the physical human form. 
 
Metaphors involve cross-domain semantic mapping, but this description is by no means 
comprehensive. In fact, only specific semantic aspects of the source and target domains may 
be involved in the metaphorical mapping process (Glucksberg 2001:52-67). Drawing on 
contextual and encyclopedic knowledge, only particular aspects of the target domain will be 
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relevant to the discourse, and hence suitable to be mapped-to. Likewise, only certain specific 
elements of the source domain can be informatively and comprehensibly mapped-from, 
namely “the kinds of things that it [the source] can epitomize” (Glucksberg 2001:55). These 
constraints contrast with the more simplistic view that metaphor involves a relatively free 
(i.e. according to the will of the speaker) mapping of any similar features shared by the 
source and target domains. These constraints, and the ways in which they are extended or 
deliberately violated by speakers, no doubt reflect the cultural and linguistic norms of the 
particular community, as well as individuals’ judgments and communicative needs (our old 
friend subjectivity). Understanding the constraints (in general, and with respect to a particular 
linguistic community) provides a useful tool for comprehending the nature of metaphorical 
extension between or within senses, and also in indicating potential core semantic features 
that are shared between senses. 
 
One proposed model sees metaphors’ as largely structured by conceptually underlying 
‘image schemas’ (Gibbs 2006:90-96). ‘Image schemas’ are “experiential gestalts” that 
“emerge throughout sensorimotor activity”, informed by “patterns of force dynamics [that] 
underlie our embodied understandings of abstract concepts” (Gibbs 2006:90). Being 
essentially cognitive models, their empirical reality cannot be definitively confirmed or 
denied. They have nevertheless proven to be useful explanatory tools. Proposed image 
schemas which may be useful in the context of this study (i.e. with reference to the above 
conceptual metaphors) are the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL, PATH, and the BALANCE image schemas 
(Gibbs 2006:90-96). For instance, take the statement, “We came to an agreement.” This 
could be interpreted as a manifestation of the metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS (Gibbs 
2006:117), and in turn providing underlying structure to this metaphor we might posit the 
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SOURCE-PATH -GOAL image schema. Once again, the image schema (SOURCE-PATH -GOAL) 
conceptually structures the notion of a destination. This concrete concept (‘a destination’) is 
then metaphorically mapped (as the metaphor’s source, via the PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS 
metaphor) onto the abstract concept ‘a purpose’ (the metaphor’s target) (Gibbs 2006:91). 
Image schemas could thus be perceived as either mechanisms or causes of semantic change 
(or both). In underlying metaphor they could be interpreted as causing the metaphor, or 
simply as a more fundamental level of the metaphor. This matter will be further discussed in 
the context of the analysis of ja and ye (section 3.3.3). 
 
A basic notion within most metaphor theory is that mappings tend to occur from more 
concrete domains towards more abstract ones (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). This assumption is 
reflected in the organization of semantic studies (such as Clarke 1974, Sinha 1971, Treerat 
1990, all discussed above, as well as the present study), which present first ‘literal’ meanings 
and then contrast them with ‘figurative’ meanings, which are (explicitly or implicitly) 
claimed to semantically derive from the original ‘literal’ meanings. It is to this idea that we 
will now briefly turn. 
 
2.3.1.1 Meaning ‘extension’ 
There is a ‘commonsense’ understanding of a contrast between ‘literal’ language and 
‘figurative’ (i.e. ‘non-literal’) language (Turner 2005). ‘Literal’ language describes the world 
transparently, ‘objectively’ and ‘truthfully’ (Turner 2005:25-26). Of a word’s senses, some 
may be ‘literal’ and others are ‘non-literal’, ‘figurative’ or ‘metaphorical’. ‘Literal’ language 
is often thought of as representing ‘concrete’ things and ‘concrete’ relationships of meaning: 
regular nouns and their tangible referents, verbs for experientially common events, or spatial 
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prepositions. ‘Non-literal’ language, on the other hand, describes more ‘abstract’ entities, 
events and relations. 
 
However, just as prototype theory advocates the idea of graded category membership, there 
is substantial evidence based in our linguistic patterns of language use that we do not actually 
implicitly recognize such a definite divide between ‘literal’ and ‘non-literal’ meaning 
(Gluckberg 2001, Coulsen & Lewandowska-Tomaszczyck 2005). 
 
Meaning is, in fact, dynamically located along a continuum of ‘literalness’. What is more: 
• non-literal (or metaphorical or figurative) meanings are just as easily produced and 
understood as literal ones;  
• both literal and non-literal meanings can, when appropriate, operate simultaneously; and 
• in a conducive context, non-literal meaning may be immediately construed and/or 
produced before literal meaning has even entered the cognitive or linguistic picture.  
 
These findings largely refute some of the most common claims about the literal/figurative 
meaning divide (Glucksberg 2001). Their implications for the present study are manifold: 
We must acknowledge that the notion of inherently ‘basic’ (and ‘centrally’ located) senses of 
ja and ye, with ‘extended’ senses branching off from them, is in some sense brought to the 
analysis, rather than pre-existent to it. Likewise, the relationships described here between all 
of the senses (‘basic’ and ‘extended’ alike) represent but one possible interpretation of the 
data. This issue is in some sense but a particular manifestation of the ‘tests for polysemy’ 
problem discussed above; the broader problem concerns whether to conceptualise a distinct 
sense, and the present (literal/figurative) one concerns how we conceptualise of distinct 
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senses (cf. Israel 2005:153-4). Thus, whilst this study cannot claim to represent any absolute 
theoretical or cognitive truth (cf. Riemer 2005), it does of course propose a principled and 
(thus) defensible explanation of the linguistic facts. In response to the specific arguments 
(above) against a clear literal/figurative divide, we will concede. We will, however, maintain 
on the basis of our prototype model of meaning categorisation, that there is a most ‘basic’ 
sense of a word, which is the prototypical instance, and other senses which are peripheral, or 
‘extensions’ (Fillmore 1982:33). Whether or not these necessarily correspond to ‘literal’ and 
‘non-literal’ meaning will be discussed during the analysis but will not be assumed.  
  
2.3.2 Causes: subjectivity and expression/efficiency 
So far we have discussed the mechanisms of semantic change, metaphor and metonymy. 
Now we turn to its causes. Semantic shift (of the kind we are here concerned with) is 
essentially innovation, starting with a single utterance that over time is progressively adopted 
until it eventually becomes commonly accepted usage. The initial act of innovation, and its 
subsequent success or failure, are commonly understood to be a result of two opposing forces 
inherent in language: efficiency and expression. The expressive imperative, that we want 
and/or need to express ourselves, within constantly evolving (and parallel) physical, 
emotional and discursive environments, is tempered by the efficiency requirement, that we 
must make sure we are understood otherwise our expression has been futile. Note that the 
dichotomy maps neatly on to the two sides of the communicative dyad: Speakers desire 
expressivity and hearers require efficiency (Traugott & Dasher 2002:17-19). Thus phrased, 
these apparently ‘opposing’ forces are revealed as “complementary sides of the same 
[communicative] coin”. Our need or desire to express ourselves in a given novel situation 
will encourage innovation and change. But that innovation and change will be constrained by 
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the requirement for communicative efficiency – if a given change interferes with successful 
communication then it will not be flourish into common usage (Geeraerts 1997:108). 
Characteristics of  prototypical categories contribute to both sides of this equation: 
Prototypical categories contain a large amount of densely structured information for 
categorizing, and structurally (in terms of the relationships between different features of a 
category) they exhibit stability in some aspects and flexibility in others. These features – 
informational density and complementary structural stability and flexibility – all contribute to 
language’s potential for communicative efficiency. The last of these features, structural 
flexibility, also offers a wealth of potential for innovative expression (Geeraerts 1997:112-
19). Efficiency/expression provides a functional explanation for semantic change; it locates 
the causes of semantic change within the basic (as we generally understand it) functions of 
language: to communicate effectively (Geeraerts 1997:103-6). An answer to the question of 
what exactly we are likely to want to communicate can be found in the second part of our 
causal explanation: Subjectivity. 
 
As (arguably) reasonably cognitively evolved beings, humans are capable of a great deal of 
empathy even (again, arguably) to the point of altruism. And yet it is hard to deny that 
overall most of our thoughts and actions most of the time are reflexively directed towards 
ourselves. This tendency, of course, is not frivolous, but has obvious evolutionary 
foundations in our instincts of survival and self-preservation. In this way subjectivity should 
also be thought of as basically a functional explanation. This basic subjectivity of our 
experience is a powerful underlying force in semantic change. This claim derives from 
observations that meanings often shift towards a more subjective orientation (Traugott & 
Dasher 2002; Marchello-Nizia 2006). Thus meaning, due to these subjective tendencies, 
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comes to be “conventionalized and reanalyzed as semantic polysemies” (Traugott & Dasher 
2002:1, emphasis added). In other words, subjectification and polysemy exist on the same 
continuum of semantic change, just at different levels of integration into common usage – 
subjectification prior and polysemy following afterwards. 
 
The two causes for semantic shift that we have thus identified, efficiency/expressive and 
subjectivity, can both be regarded as semantic change attractors. Attractors are ‘preferred 
patterns’ that a system will evolve towards; they “reflect emerging points of stability in a 
system as it engages in real-world interaction” Gibbs (2006:114-115). In this case, new 
information (semantic change) feeding into the system (our individual and shared linguistic 
practice) gravitates towards a conceptual point grounded in our experientially- based models 
of ourselves (subjectivity) and linguistic communication (efficiency/expression).  
 
Within this section we have explored polysemy’s primary mechanisms (metaphor and 
metonymy) and causes (subjectivity and efficiency/expressivity). 
 
 
2.4 Representing meaning 
There are a variety of ways commonly utilized by linguists to discuss, analyse and represent 
meaning. Underlying many of them are some key suppositions, one of which is that meaning 
is decomposable, or at least re-composable. This assumption, of course, also underlies the 
very existence of semantic analyses such as this one. 
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Semanticists often employ reductive paraphrases, couched either in (relatively) familiar (eg. 
NSM) or more abstract (eg. Jackendoff’s conceptual semantics) metalanguage (see Goddard 
1998:56-68 for a summary of different approaches). Both assume semantic primitives, and 
both have a limited lexicon and a distinct syntax. But semantic primitives are problematic (cf. 
Riemer 2005), and as an examination of their feasibility is not my purpose, they will be 
avoided altogether. 
 
Instead, ordinary English paraphrase will be used. The implicit claim is not necessarily that 
the paraphrases are semantically simpler than the objects of analysis, but that they expound 
more explicitly the semantic details of the objects of analysis. It must at any rate be 
remembered that any description of meaning is “grounded as much in the semantics of the 
metalanguage as in those of the object language. The ‘correct definition’ of an object 
language term is thus not a single construct, but a field of alternative analyses that can be 
recast in a number of possible ways” (Riemer 2005:155). 
 
Whilst the primary metalanguage up to this point has been, and for the ensuing analysis of ja 
and ye will be, ordinary English, I will also utilize a schematic representation of a ‘basic 
motion event’ using Talmy’s (1985) terminology outlined in section 2.2.1. This should not be 
understood as an abstract metalanguage, but merely as a more concise way of expressing 
information which could just as acceptably be expressed (albeit more capaciously) in 
ordinary English. The schematic representation lays out the constituents of the ‘basic motion 
event’ and thereon displays a visual mapping of the constituent(s) that are more semantically 
prevalent in a given example. The value of this tool will become apparent as we see that ja 
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and ye (like COME and GO more generally), whether in their ‘basic’ or ‘extended’ senses, 
often vary as to which constituent they focus on.  
 
So, the ‘basic motion event’, in chronological order, is: 
 
Figure (F) at 
Source 
F departs 
from Source 
F moves 
away from 
Source 
F moves 
along Path 
Figure moves 
towards Goal 
Figure 
arrives at 
Goal 
Figure at 
Goal 
I II III IV V VI VII 
 
The often subtle ‘shift’ from one constituent to the next alludes to the lack of truly distinct 
boundaries between them; the Figure leaving the Source (II) logically requires that it was, in 
the first place, at the Source (I)2, and the Figure moving along a Path (IV) is self-evidently 
moving away from somewhere (III) and simultaneously towards somewhere else (V), and so 
on. The point is not that these are discreet constituents, but that they are each aspects of the 
motion event, which in a given sense (or instance) of the verb can be semantically 
highlighted, or more or less focused on or emphasised. Thus the constituents (I-VII) are not 
being claimed to be functionally or semantically discrete, rather they should be more 
accurately conceived as a continuum. Also note that a combination of different areas along 
the continuum can be variously semantically emphasised (or perhaps, differentially 
semantically ‘weighted’). These ideas can be represented as follows: 
 
 
                                                
2 Distinguishing constituent I could be useful in a context where the presence of the Figure at the Source is the 
motivation for the comment. eg. A person has outstayed his welcome and says “I will go”. The person (Figure) 
departing  the Source is relevant (constituent II), but what is equally relevant in this particular situation is that 
the Figure is (still!) at the Source in the first place (I). 
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“Go!” 
Figure (F) at 
Source 
F departs 
from Source 
F moves 
away from 
Source 
F moves 
along Path 
Figure moves 
towards Goal 
Figure 
arrives at 
Goal 
Figure at 
Goal 
I II III IV V VI VII 
 
 
The above illustrates that the semantic focus of this instance of go is around constituents II-
III. This could be contrasted with: 
 
“He goes home.” (i.e. habitually) 
Figure (F) at 
Source 
F departs 
from Source 
F moves 
away from 
Source 
F moves 
along Path 
Figure moves 
towards Goal 
Figure 
arrives at 
Goal 
Figure at 
Goal 
I II III IV V VI VII 
 
 
and: 
 
“He is going home.” (i.e. right now) 
Figure (F) at 
Source 
F departs 
from Source 
F moves 
away from 
Source 
F moves 
along Path 
Figure moves 
towards Goal 
Figure 
arrives at 
Goal 
Figure at 
Goal 
I II III IV V VI VII 
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Semantic ‘weighting’ of the various constituents is represented in the size and concentration 
of the shaded regions underneath the corresponding constituent. Remember that the diagrams 
could of course be paraphrased in ordinary language. For instance, in the first example, go 
focuses on the Figure leaving and moving away from the Source (constituent II and III), 
whilst in the second example, explicit mention of the Goal has the effect of shifting some of 
the semantic focus over to the Figure’s movement towards and (possibly) arrival at the Goal 
(V & VI), whilst still maintaining some semantic weight on the Figure’s leaving the Source 
and moving away from it along a Path (II, III & IV). The exact proportionate ‘weightings’ 
depend on the specifics of the context and the interpretations intended and understood by the 
speaker and hearer respectively.  
 
One advantage of the diagrams is that they capture the ‘fuzzy edges’ that are characteristic of 
(both components within, and at the edges of) prototypical categories, and hence reflect the 
theoretical stance of this study that meaning is organized according to similar prototype-like 
principles. Also, they express very clearly the fact that different constituents of the motion 
event are being semantically emphasized in different proportions. In this regard they will be 
especially useful in identifying event-internal metonymy (where specific constituents are 
selected for semantic emphasis). The diagrams, however, still fail to represent more subtle 
levels of meaning specific to the particular usage, such as the existence or the nature of the 
interrelationships between the different constituents, or the extent to which the verb in a 
given instance refers to the event as a whole, or relationships with other elements external to 
the event (such as, say, the cause of motion). These observations about the interdependence 
of the constituents and the difficulty of specifying the nature of connections between them 
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reinforces the earlier observation of the arbitrariness of divisions, whether within or at the 
borders of, a motion event (cf. Riemer 2005). 
 
Whilst the shaded ‘fuzzy-edged’ representations are visually useful and conceptually 
revealing, they are somewhat cumbersome. As such I will ‘abbreviate’ them to the following: 
 
“Go!” 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
 +++ +++ ++ 
 
Concentrations of shaded grey are replaced by concentrations of + signs. ‘Fuzzy’ edges 
should be assumed. So, +++, ++, + represent respectively high, medium and low 
concentrations of semantic weighting at the allocated constituent with fuzzy edges which, 
when adjacent, blend into each other.  
 
Additionally, to keep an eye on any possible ‘figurative’ deixis, in examples where it is 
deemed that a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ evaluation could be assigned to the sentence’s referent (or a 
part of it) this will be indicated next to the constituency weighting diagram: 
elektrisitii gelii aahe, 
electricity go-pst-3sf be-prs-3s 
There’s a blackout. [Shr] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
+++       /ja-bad  
 
elektrisitii parat aalii 
electricity back come-pst-3sf. 
The electricity is back on. [Shr] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-good 
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These abbreviated analytical tools are provided as a means of tracking the semantic 
properties of individual examples as they are presented, but all patterns or other points of 
interest that they reveal will be explained and discussed in the primary metalanguage of this 
study, ordinary English. 
 
2.5 Summary 
• Deixis and polysemy are the backbone of the ensuing semantic analyses. 
• The concepts of subjectivity, embodiment and prototypicality permeate the theoretical 
framework, and in many cases draw elements of it together. 
• Deixis is a crucial part of the meaning of GO and COME, especially COME. 
• Space and time are key underlying conceptual structures of GO and COME. 
• Deictic properties can extend from the ‘literal’ to the ‘figurative’ realm of language. 
• Polysemy concerns the multiple historically related senses of a word. 
• Polysemy occurs due to causes like subjectivity and efficiency/expression, and via 
mechanisms like metaphor and metonymy (and underlyingly image schemas). 
• A clear literal/figurative linguistic divide is fictitious, and at any rate, probably not useful 
in understanding our actual meaning-making practices. 
• No semantic metalanguage is perfect. Ordinary English provides an approachable (to 
analyst and reader) metalanguage, potentially as adequate as any other. 
 
Upon this theoretical grounding we will commence the semantic analysis of ja and ye.  
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CHAPTER THREE: SEMANTICS OF JA AND YE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Marathi verbs ja and ye are primarily used, like GO and COME, to indicate motion of 
objects (Figures), often people, through space. But they are also used in a variety of other 
semantic contexts. 
 
The analysis will proceed with respect to the two main theoretical loci, as outlined in chapter 
two: Deixis and polysemy. We saw in chapter two that deictic properties are crucial to the 
various uses and senses of COME and GO; they form an integral part of the semantic structure 
of the verbs. It will similarly be seen that the semantic structures of ja and ye rely heavily on 
their deictic properties.  
 
Initially (section 3.2) the semantics of ja and ye as verbs of motion through space will be 
examined; their ‘basic’ senses (to continue with our established terminology). Here we will 
examine the deictic properties of basic ja and ye, as well as other aspects such as ‘basic 
motion event’ constituent selection as outlined in section 2.4 (Representing Meaning). 
Following, (3.3) we will turn to other ‘extended’ senses of ja and ye and investigate their 
semantic affiliation with the basic senses, as well as the processes of semantic change that 
these extended senses have undergone; the mechanisms and the causes thereof. 
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3.1.1 Data 
Data for the study consists of over four hundred sentences containing any word form of the 
two lexemes (ja and ye) under investigation, which were drawn from several sources 
(approximate number of instances from each source shown in brackets).  
1. (270) Ayurvedic books written in Marathi by native speakers, and used widely in 
Maharashtra as primary sources in doctor training. Specifically, two books were 
selected as the chief data sources:  
a. the Mahadhawanidaan, a diagnostic manual [MaNi]; and  
b. the Padaarthawidnaan, a treatise on the basic principles of Ayurveda based on 
the fundamentals of Classical Indian philosophy [PaVi].  
Both are Marathi commentaries on Sanskrit primary sources. 
2. (80) Two Marathi grammars, Pandharipande (1997) [P97], and Wali (2005) [W05]. 
3. (30) Two Marathi-English dictionaries, Molesworth’s (2nd ed. 1989) [Mol], and 
Navneet [Nav]; and one English-Marathi dictionary, Oxford (2003) [Oxf]. 
4. (60) Elicited sentences from several native speakers representing a range of different 
regional dialects [Shr], [Vish], [Smit], [Ash], [Brd]. 
 
The abbreviations shown after each source in square brackets will be used, along with a page 
number reference, to indicate the source of each example. For example [MaNi:56; Vish] 
indicates that the example comes from page 56 of the Mahadvanidan, and was translated with 
the assistance of the native speaker coded ‘Vish’. 
 
Written texts were predominantly used primarily for practical reasons, avoiding the heavy 
time and technical demands of transcription and spoken pragmatic devices like gesture.  
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 3.1.2 Dictionary definitions 
Many senses of ja and ye are listed in the dictionaries consulted but these will receive little 
attention during the analysis. It is well observed that distinct dictionary-defined senses do not 
necessarily correlate with speakers’ intuitions about sense boundaries (Riemer 2005:74). 
Secondly, these are based on observations of usage, which, whether they do or do not reflect 
folk categorization of the senses, are nonetheless not (necessarily) grounded in a systematic 
semantic analysis as is applied in this study. 
 
3.1.3 Ja vs. Ye? 
As alluded to in chapter two, COME and GO are often assumed to comprise a binary 
opposition, and also (thus) a complete or closed semantic set. This assumption is probably 
based on the situation in English, and in fact is not supported by cross-linguistic data 
(Wilkins and Hill 1995; Goddard 1998).  
 
One such complicating factor in the case of Marathi is the word chaal. Often translated as 
‘go’, chaal means to proceed or move, and seems to differ from ja in that it doesn’t have the 
same emphasis on departure from a Source. Rather, it is used to indicate more general 
(translational) movement where the direction of movement is not specified. The reason why 
ja is here being analysed in opposition to ye, then, is because it more closely mirrors the 
English language opposition between movement towards the deictic centre (speaker or 
projected; come/ye), and movement which is explicitly not towards that center (go/ja). Whilst 
on the face of it this is a reasonable opposition on which to select ja vs. ye, failing the space 
to conduct a thorough investigation into chaal, the precise nature of the semantic distinction 
between chaal, ja, and ye, cannot be specified and thus should not be assumed. 
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3.2 ‘Basic’ senses: Ja and ye as verbs of motion through space 
The following discussion will focus on two key interrelating aspects of ja and ye in their 
respective senses as verbs of motion through space: (i) their deictic properties, and (ii) their 
variable reference to constituents of the ‘basic motion event’. These two aspects are closely 
related because two significant aspects of the ‘basic motion event’ are the Source and Goal 
locations, which we have seen are often variously deictically referenced by COME and GO. 
 
 3.2.1 Grammatically invited inference 
Even within the basic senses of ja and ye we still encounter much semantic variation. This 
variation is often due to ‘grammatically invited inference’. Grammatically invited inferences 
arise due to choices about which aspects of a situation or event are made linguistically 
explicit, such as which verbal arguments to mention and how to encode the tense-aspect-
mood. Whilst their effects are not the focus of this study, they are nevertheless relevant 
because they can occur in systematic or regular relationship with particular senses of ja and 
ye. 
 
For instance, tense-aspect plays a role in determining the semantic qualities of ye in the 
following examples: 
 
1 mii gharii yet aahe. 
 I home-Loc. come-Pres.Part be-prs-1s 
I am coming home 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   +++ +++ 
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2 (kaal) mii gharii aalo. 
 (yesterday) I home-Loc. come-pst-1sm 
(Yesterday) I came home. 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   + ++ +++ +++   
 
The two sentences describe the same event. In 1, in present progressive tense-aspect, the 
semantic focus is on the Path and the motion towards the Goal (IV & V). In 2, however, in 
past (and perfective) tense-aspect the semantic focus shifts onto the arrival at the Goal and 
the subsequent location (existence) of the Figure at the Goal. 
 
This is because the tense-aspect system anchors the utterance deictically with respect to some 
combination of the events described in the utterance, the rest of the discourse, and the coding 
time or some other reference time. That is to say, the tense-aspect is a deictic marker, and one 
effect of variation in tense-aspect deictic marking is variation in constituent focus. 
 
Clearly, however, we cannot say that examples 1 and 2 represent two distinct senses of ye. 
The two sentences refer to the same event and so make use of the same sense. What is 
variable is simply the perspective on the event. One reason to take note of this is because it 
will be seen below (section 3.4) that some of ja and ye’s extended senses are characterized by 
their shift in semantic focus in precisely this way, i.e. towards a focus on the constituent(s) 
representing the result or outcome of the event.  
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Interestingly, the grammatically invited inference of increasing semantic focus on the Path 
(as seen above in the progressive aspect) can be similarly invoked by use of a lexical item 
which refers specifically to the Path, such as saphar ‘journey’: 
 
3 mii sapharawar jaaiin. 
 I journey-on go-fut-1s 
I will go on a journey 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
 +++ + +++  
 
Consider, finally, the following examples which show that grammatically invited inference is 
even more pervasive than just the immediate syntactic environment, extending even across 
different parts of the discourse: The same word (gelo) in the same utterance is variably 
semantically imbued depending on the preceding utterance. (A & B are conversation 
partners):  
4 A: “to aataa kuthe aahe?”  (Where is he now?) 
B: “to shaalalaa gelo”   (He went to school.) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
 +    + +++ 
 
Versus: 
5 A: “to ithe aahe ka?”    (Is he here?)  
B: “to shaalalaa gelo”   (He went to school.) (i.e. No, he is not here) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
+++ +++ ++   ++? ++?3 
                                                
3 ‘?’ indicates that the speaker assumes (but does not necessarily know) that the Figure has arrived (or will 
arrive) at the Goal, and subsequently is (or will be) located there. 
 55 
Apart from anything else, the variation between 4 and 5 highlights the difficulty of prying 
apart semantics and pragmatics (cf. section 2.1.2). 
 
Whilst numerous studies have observed that different senses of polysemous words tend to 
occur in distinctive grammatical contexts (Robert 2008:85), these distinctive contexts 
nevertheless do not define the sense (cf. section 2.3 on tests for polysemy). They may be 
thought of as an effect of the sense or as a secondary attribute, but the sense definition will 
include other factors. 
  
 3.2.2 Ja 
In order to find the basic sense of ja an intuitive step is to examine some very ‘basic’ 
sentences containing the verb: 
 
6 “Jaa!”   (Go!) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
 +++ ++ 
 
7 “To jaato.”  (He goes.) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
 +++ +++ ++ 
 
Sentence 6, the imperative, deictically specifies the Source as the location of the addressee, 
i.e. “Go [from here]!” The speaker is generally at the same location as the addressee, 
explaining why we intuit “Go[from here]!”  - ‘here’ referring deictically to the location of the 
speaker. But, in the case of speaker and addressee not being co-located, a phone conversation 
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for instance, “Go!” obviously intends the addressee to leave her own location i.e. “Go [from 
there]!”. Thus, departure from and movement away from the Source (II-III) are emphasized. 
Example 7 is similarly semantically weighted (in terms of the constituents), but the Source is 
much less firmly deictically anchored to the location of the speaker or addressee. Indeed it is 
just as likely to be tied to the location of the subject of the narrative to ‘he’, but context (such 
as whether the speaker and/or addressee are also co-located with to ‘he’) will probably be a 
determining factor. Both of them, however, fail to recognize that ja (like English go) is often 
pragmatically accompanied by a specified Goal, whether or not it is explicitly encoded. Thus 
To jato ‘He goes’ quite likely means ‘He goes [somewhere/there/home etc.]’: 
 
8 “[Roj] to [ofisla] jaato.”  (He goes [everyday to the office]) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
    + ++ ++ +++ 
 
Recall, however (section 2.1.2), that if an element is not explicitly included we will here 
assume it to be (also) implicitly absent. The inclusion of a Goal, then, significantly shifts the 
constituent focus. Recall Goddard’s (1998) requirement of two separate explications for 
(English) ‘go’ and ‘go with a specified Source and/or Goal’. Similarly, contrast: 
 
9 “to gelo.”   (He went) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
 +++ 
 
10 “to gharii gelo.”  (He went home) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
 +++ + + +++ +? +? 
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The deictic property observed when a Goal is not specified (e.g. the imperative “Ja!”) does 
not merely disappear, though, in the Goal-specified examples (8, 10). The Goal of ja’s 
motion is overwhelmingly a location other than the speaker’s at coding time; in this regard it 
is like English come (Fillmore 1971:50). This specification is, however, perhaps slightly less 
strict in Marathi as the following example shows, where the speaker could be located at 
coding time in Nagpur: 
 
11 tuu kadhii naagpurlaa gelii aahes ka? 
 you ever Nagpur-Dat go-pst-3sf be-prs-2s Q 
Have you ever been to Nagpur? [P97:417] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
     + +++ 
 
In this scenario in English we use been or maybe come, but gone definitely sounds odd. 
 
So, even in a range of very simple sentences we observe variation in the deictic and 
constituent-focusing properties of the ‘basic’ sense of ja. How then – on the basis of which 
examples, to provide a definition of ‘basic’ ja?  
 
Firstly, (disregarding its superlative morphological simplicity) the imperative will not be 
proposed as the most basic use of ja’s basic sense, due to its sole use in a very specific and 
marked pragmatic situation. The imperative of any verb is distinguished by its orientation to 
the addressee’s current situation: the addressee is not currently doing whatever it is that the 
speaker is commanding. Thus the Source-orientation of “Ja!” is perhaps as much due to the 
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fact that the Source is the location of the addressee at coding time, rather than that Source is 
ja’s most semantically dominant constituent. 
 
Next, without a principled reason to decide whether the Goal- and/or Source- specified 
examples represent the ‘basic’ usage, or if it is where these locations are not specified, we 
must content ourselves (like Goddard’s NSM go explication in section 2.2.1) with two 
parallel basic senses. This exemplifies the potential complicating effects of grammatically 
invited inference.  
 
For our purposes we will propose the following generalizations about basic ja: 
 
1. it encodes movement that is usually to a Goal that is not the coding time location of 
the speaker or the addressee. 
2. if no other contextual elements or constituents of the motion event are specified, then 
the semantic focus is on constituents I-III.  
3. if the Goal is specified then this will raise constituents V-VII’s weighting (and 
probably concordantly lower I-III’s weighting).  
4. if the Path is somehow specified (such as use of the present continuous tense/aspect, 
or inclusion of a Path-focusing lexical item like ‘journey’) then IV’s weighting will 
increase. 
 
The variations in 2. to 4. are metonymic effects, selecting or deselecting constituents of the 
event such that the general motion event word ja stands for only the combination of selected 
constituents. So, even within a single sense of the word metonymic effects are constantly 
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occurring. Also, as it happens, the same statement is true of metaphorical effects; these will 
be discussed in section 3.3.1  
 
 3.2.3 Ye 
As with ja, we will start with some ‘basic’ (looking) sentences containing ye. 
 
12 “Ye!”  (Come!) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   ++ +++ + 
 
13 “Tii yete.” (She comes.) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   ++ +++ + 
 
14 “Tii gharii yete.” (She comes home) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   ++ +++ + 
 
15 “Tii gharii aalii.” (She came home) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   ++ ++ +++ +++  
 
So far, ye most frequently and strongly emphasizes constituent V – motion towards the Goal. 
This is slightly affected in 15 by a grammatically invited inference, specifically the past-
perfective tense-aspect, which inheres a perspective to the constituents representing the result 
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of the (otherwise) semantic focus (V) – arrival of and presence of the Figure at the Goal (VI-
VII). 
 
Another grammatically invited inference is activated if the Source is specified, and the focus 
shifts accordingly (partially) to the relevant constituents (I-III): 
 
16 mii kaal mumbaiihuun aalo. 
 I yesterday Bombay-Abl. come-pst-3sm 
Yesterday, I came from Bombay. [P97:336] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
+++ +++ +++ +++ ++ ++ + 
 
17 gharaachyaa aatuun aawaaj aalaa. 
 house-Poss. in-from sound-3sm come-pst-3sm 
The sound came from inside the house. [P97:339] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
++ +++ ++ + + 
 
The Goal still receives some attention, either a significant amount and from V all the way to 
VII (in 16), or only a more subtle suggestion from the implicature that the sound (Figure) 
was heard by the speaker (or someone who had reported to the speaker) in 17.  
 
The fact that the understood Goal in examples 12 and 16 is ‘where I (the speaker) am now 
(coding time)’, and of 17 is ‘where I (speaker) was at the time of the event (reference time)’, 
suggests that ye contains a similar inherent core quality to English come (and COME in many 
other languages). As discovered in section 2.2.1 COME is centrally defined by being (i) a verb 
of motion and (ii) having a Goal which is deictically located, often at (or with respect to) the 
location of the speaker, but also possibly elsewhere depending on the properties of deictic 
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projection that the language allows (generally and for this verb specifically). Marathi, it 
appears, is no different. And the rules of deictic projection are also fairly similar to English, 
as we see the deictic centre shifted by the speaker to: 
(i) the location of the addressee:  
 
18 “mii tithe yeuu ka?”   (Shall I come there?) 
I II III IVp V  VI VII 
   ++ +++ +++ 
 
(ii) the location of a third party (Vaishali is in Kolhapur but the speaker or addressee are not):  
 
19 mii purchaa aathawadyaat kolhapuurlaa yenar aahe,  
 I next week-Loc Kolhapur-Dat come-fut be-prs-1s 
 
he  vaishaliilaa mahitii  aahe ka? 
this Vaishali-Dat know-prs-3sf be-prs Q? 
Does Vaishali know that I’m coming to Kolhapur next week? [Vish]  
I II III IVp V  VI VII 
   + ++ +++ +++ 
 
This usage is, however, restricted to third-party-locations that the speaker has some claim of 
affinity or association with. The speaker of the above example, for instance, although not in 
Kolhapur at coding time, would be understood to have been there before, or at the very least 
to have family members there. As one informant puts it ye is an “emotional word”, it “has 
some hidden meaning”. 
 
(iii) a potential or imagined location (in the following example it is the imagined location of 
the addressee): 
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20 mii darwajya aalo pan tuu tithe nauhota! 
 I door come-pst-1sm but you there be-pst-Neg-2sm 
I came to the front door, but you weren’t there! 
I II III IVp V  VI VII 
   + + ++ +++ 
 
Based on such similar possibilities of deictic projection as English come, and on the observed 
Goal-orientation – whether movement towards it (constituent V) or arrival and location at it 
(VI-VII), we will propose a basic sense of ye fairly similar to Goddard’s (1998) explication 
of English come (obviously though, not in NSM but in our metalanguage of ordinary 
English): 
 
Ye encodes movement to a Goal that is the location – real, imagined or potential – of either 
the speaker or addressee, or is a place to which the speaker claims personal affiliation. 
 
Of course the final element, ‘a personal affiliation’, is ill-defined, but the exact nature of this 
‘affiliation’ will need to be left as the subject of future work. Also, as with the above 
discussion of basic ja, constituent metonymy effects due to grammatically invited inference 
(see variation in constituency weighting diagrams for 12 to 20) are absorbed within the 
meaning of this basic sense of ye. 
 
Having thus defined the basic senses of ja and ye, the analysis will proceed to senses 
semantically extended from them. 
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3.3 Meaning ‘extensions’ 
From these basic senses of ja and ye several other semantically related but distinct senses 
have developed. They have developed by way of the mechanisms of semantic change, 
metonymy and metaphor, and due to the causes of semantic change, subjectivity and 
efficiency/expressivity, as detailed in chapter two. Because many of the extended senses 
involve combinations of the mechanisms, the senses will be presented individually rather 
than being classified according to mechanism. A discussion of causes will follow. 
 
 3.3.1 Metaphorical applications of ‘basic’ senses 
Oftentimes, what may appear as extended senses are actually metaphorical applications of 
the basic senses (cf. Riemer 2005). The uncertainty arises because the context of usage may 
be highly metaphorical, including elements not prototypically part of a basic motion event. 
These usages, however, should still be treated as instances of the basic senses because 
although the metaphorical mechanism is being applied, it is not to the verb (ja or ye) itself, 
but rather to other elements of the ‘basic motion event’, such as the Source, Figure, Path or 
Goal. Once one or several of the basic motion event elements have become the targets of 
metaphorical mapping, which often takes the prototypical metaphorical form of  [ABSTRACT] 
IS A [CONCRETE], then the elements (along with their appropriately mapped source attributes) 
are free to participate in the basic motion event. Whilst these instances, then, do not 
constitute extended senses of ja and ye, they are included in this section because they are 
nevertheless less prototypical uses of the verbs. In other words, the verb’s sense remains 
basic, but the broader grammatical and pragmatic context of its use is extended. 
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Recall (section 2.3) that properties of a metaphor’s target or source domains are more or less 
suitable for being metaphorically mapped. Thus, depending on whether highly suitable 
elements of the source and target are cross-mapped, or less suitable elements, we find a 
continuum of metaphors ranging from the very conventional and readily decipherable to the 
highly unusual and decipherably opaque (with everything in between). 
 
The subtle effects of basic motion event elements being more highly metaphorical or less-so 
in sentences containing ja and ye can be seen in the following: 
 
21 hyaa utpann houun tyaachaa praaN jaato. 
 this produce(n.) become-Conj.Part he-Poss life(m.) go-prs-3sm 
this having occured, he [the patient] dies. [MaNi:85] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
+++ +++      /ja-bad 
 
22 praaN pakheru uduun gele 
 life(m.) birds fly-Conj.Part. go-pst-3plm 
He passed away (eupemistic) [Shr] (Lit: Life-birds flew away) 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
+++ +++ + +    /ja-bad 
 
In both 21 and 22 the metaphor’s source praaN ‘life’ is mapped onto the target Figure. In the 
second example, however, praaN takes on the form of a mythical or imaginary animal, it is 
ornitho-morphised. By taking on this tangible form it becomes somewhat less metaphorical, 
because a prototypical Figure is a concrete physical object such as pakheru ‘birds’ rather than 
an abstract concept such as praaN ‘life’. This accounts for the perceived effect of the more 
motion-bearing constituents (III-IVp) receiving greater emphasis in 22. The existence of an 
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abstract concept is perhaps fairly directly conceptually analogous with the location of a 
physical object at a location (constituent I), as suggested in the fact that cross-linguistically 
“the word for ‘happen’ [often has a] secondary meaning approximating ‘appear’ or ‘arrive’” 
(Goddard 2001:24). Thus an abstract entity (praaN ‘life’) not being somewhere simply 
equates to it not existing. Its actual physical motion, on the other hand, is perhaps less easily 
imagined, and hence less completely synthesized into the metaphor. In these examples ja is 
semantically most similar to the Goal-unspecified exemplars above (6 & 7: Ja! ‘Go!’; to 
jaato ‘He goes’). This may logically suit this particular metaphorical application because 
where exactly life ‘goes’ when one dies, and by what route (i.e. a Goal and a Path), do not 
necessarily have meaningful answers, especially within the normal wordly context of basic 
motion events. This analysis would clearly benefit from a more thorough integration of 
cultural details (such as metaphysical beliefs on whether life can actually ‘go’ somewhere, 
and if so, where?) and native-speaker intuitions (on, for instance, the relative abstractness of 
praaN and praaN pakheru). 
 
Another metaphorical application of ja’s basic sense, this time of the Goal-specified variety:  
23 mi vikopaas jaato! 
 I aggression(m.)-near go-prs-1sm 
I’m at my wits end! [Vish] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
    ++ +++ ++? /ja-bad 
 
24 ajiirN phaar vikopaas gele. 
 indigestion(n.) very  aggression(m.)-near go-pst-1sn 
(The) indigestion is in its final stages. [MaNi:59; Vish] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   + +++ +++ /ja-bad 
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The abstract concept vikop ‘aggression’ is metaphorically mapped to the Goal, and then 
motion occurs towards it; motion either of the highly prototypical Figure mii ‘I’ (in 23) or of 
the much more highly figurative Figure ajiirn ‘indigestion’ (in 24). The intermixing of 
elements of varying metaphoricity, and the flexibility even within one highly syntactically 
specified example (vikopaas jaaNe) attests to the plasticity of the language and of our 
linguistic faculties, as discussed above regarding the literal/figurative ‘divide’. 
  
Also, temporal expressions are metaphorical applications of the basic senses of ja and ye: 
 
25 jewaNaapuurviiche don taas (ajuun) jaayachet. 
 lunch-until two hours (still, yet) go-Inf.-Poss.-3pl 
Two hours to go before lunch. [Oxf:325] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   ++ ++ +++    
 
26 aamchyaa gharaaNyaachaa itihaas gelyaa 300 warshanchaa aahe. 
 us-Poss lineage(n.)-Poss history(m.) go-perf. 300 years-Poss be-prs-3s 
Our family goes back 300 years. [Oxf:326] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   ++ ++  +++  
 
27 tiche naaw itihaasaat lihile jaaiil. 
 she-Poss name history(m.)-Loc read-pst-3sf go-fut-3s 
Her name will go down in history. [Oxf:326] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   ++ ++  +++ 
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This is an interesting metaphorical application because an abstract entity, time, is seemingly 
both Figure and Path simultaneously: Time is moving (or more specifically, going), but with 
respect to what medium (Ground) is it moving? Time!  
 
28 weL jaato 
 time(m.) go-prs-3sm 
Time passes. [Shr] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   +++  
 
29 divas agadii mand gatiine jaat aahet. 
 days quite slow speed(f.)-Inst. go-Prs.Part be-prs-3pl 
The days go by so slowly4. [Oxf:326] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   +++ 
 
Moreover, Source and Goal being specific parts of the Ground, time is also apparently 
simultaneously ‘going’ away from (a particular moment in) time (the Source), and towards 
(another particular moment in) time (the Goal), which of course it is! In the above examples 
the provision of a specific point in time (sometimes more specific jewan ‘lunch’, 300 warsha 
‘300 years’, and sometimes less so itihaas ‘history’) locates a Goal. Note that in all cases a 
significant proportion of the focus remains on the Path (IV), more systematically and 
consistently than in basic ja. This may be interpreted as a reflection of the nature of time as a 
                                                
4 Note the use of the progressive construction …jaat aahet, literally ‘…are going’ is translated into the habitual 
aspect. This is typical in Marathi (Wali 2005:30), and probably in other Indo-Aryan languages as well as it 
reflects a common Indian-Englishism of using the present participle construction (i.e progressive aspect) when 
referring to a habitual event, e.g. ‘Every morning at 9 I am going to work.’ 
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metaphorical Figure/Path: It is difficult to conceive of time ever not moving or being moved 
along (or ‘through’, as we would say in English).5  
 
Marathi speakers may also speak deictically of time moving towards a subjectively oriented 
Goal, such as ‘me’ (the speaker) ‘now’ (coding time), using ye: 
 
30 diwaalii aalii. 
 Diwali come-pst-3sf 
It’s Diwali. [Shr] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
     +++ +++ 
 
31 diwaalii yet aahe. 
 Diwali come-Prs.Part be-prs-3s 
Diwali is coming. [Shr] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   +++ +++ 
 
This analysis of time phrases conflicts with Fillmore’s (1982:33) assertion that “a prototype 
semanticist would explicitly not choose to construct a single general formulation of the 
meaning of the word that would simultaneously cover both its spatial and its temporal uses.” 
On the contrary, my analysis proposes that the semantic domain of time is less prototypically 
associated with basic motion events, but in theory is as suitable a source for metaphorical 
mapping as any of the other semantic domains we have so far seen mapped onto ja and ye 
(cf. discussion in 2.2.2 and McGlone’s 2001:103).  
                                                
5 This distinction – moving ‘along’ or ‘through’ time, is not really a distinction at all, for a Path is nothing but a 
series of contiguous points within (or upon) the Ground, i.e. the Path is part of the Ground. There is, however, 
obvious cause to single out the Source and Goal as points of particular interest in the context of motion events. 
This is also corroborated by cognitive linguistic work which has led to image schemas like SOURCE-PATH-GOAL 
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Whilst the ja temporal examples express both ego-moving and the time-moving metaphors 
(i.e. where people ‘move’ through time, or time ‘moves’ towards or away from people; 
Lakoff & Johnson 1980), the data does not present any ego-moving ye examples (e.g. ‘We 
are coming up to Diwali’), and indeed one informant claimed this was not acceptable in 
Marathi. This by no means, however, indicates that the Ground (including Source and Goal) 
of ye may not be metaphorical, as the following examples demonstrate. 
 
32 mi janmaat aalo. 
 I existence-Loc come-pst-1sm 
I was born. [Shr] 
I II III IV V VI VII 
     ++ +++ /ye-good 
 
33 to prashna ajuun aalaach naahii. 
 that question yet come-pst- be-prs-Neg 
The question hasn’t come up yet. [Oxf:145] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ 
 
34 (achaanak) kaahii aDachaNii aalyaa aahet. 
 (suddenly) some problem(f.)-pl. come-Ger. be-prs-3pl 
A couple of problems have come up. [Oxf:145] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-bad 
 
In all three cases (32-34) there is a (more or less) metaphorical Path and Goal. In general in 
this section we have seen a wide variety of elements – and combinations of elements – of the 
basic motion event being metaphorized, and then applied to the basic senses of both ja and 
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ye. The following section will show some cases where the basic senses of ja and ye are 
themselves extended via the mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy. 
  
3.3.2 ‘Extended’ senses with metaphor and metonymy 
Three extended senses will be presented, two of ye and one of ja. 
 
Ye as a measure of physical extent or evaluative degree: 
 
35 hii aangaThii toLaabhar vadzan yeiil. 
 this ring(f.) 1 tola weight come-fut-3s 
This ring weighs 1 tola (10 grams) [Mol:677; Brd] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ 
 
36 he paagoTe changale aale naahii aNkhii baandh. 
 this turban good come-pst-3sn be-prs-Neg. again tie-Imp. 
This turban is not good, tie it again. [Mol:677; Brd] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
     + +++  /ye-bad 
 
37 ghar agadii moDakaLiis aale aahe. 
 house literally broken come-pst-3sn is-prs-3s 
The house is nearly broken (i.e. is in bad condition). [Mol:677; Brd] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
   + +++ +  /ye-bad 
  
38 bil wiis paunDaaitake aale  
 bill 20 pounds-much come-pst-3sn  
The bill came to 20 pounds. [Oxf:145] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
     + +++ 
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As in some of the above ‘metaphorical applications’ examples, we see here a host of 
metaphorical Goals, vadzan ‘weight’ (35), changale naahii ‘not good’ (36), modakaliis 
‘broken’ (37) and wis paund ‘20 pounds’ (38). The difference in these examples (35-38), 
which makes them a separate sense rather than just metaphorical applications of the basic 
sense, is that the motion itself is metaphorical: There are relatively prototypical Figures, 
physical objects which are perfectly capable of movement (hii angathii ‘this ring’, he 
paagote ‘this turban’, ghar ‘[the] house’ and bil ‘[the] bill’), which ‘come’ but which do not 
actually move anywhere. The attendant claim, then, is that making ye’s motion metaphorical 
is a more fundamental semantic shift than making other elements (its Figure or Goal, say) 
metaphorical, and is hence more likely to result in the development of a distinct sense. A 
potential counterargument would point out that having a highly metaphorical Figure such as 
praaN ‘life’ (in example 21) would seem to necessarily entail abstract (i.e. more 
metaphorical) motion – because an abstract object cannot literally move. But in this case 
(21), the initial metaphorization of the Figure (praaN) allows the motion to be metaphorical 
without undermining the basic sense of the verb. This contrasts with the sense currently 
being discussed, where a physical (and so more literal or prototypical) Figure moves 
metaphorically, and thus seems to produce (along with other factors no doubt) the 
interpretation of a separate sense. 
 
A further feature of this sense is constituent metonymy placing semantic focus around the 
result of the motion event, namely, the arrival of the Figure at the Goal and its subsequent 
presence there (constituents VI-VII). Whilst these constituents are also semantically 
dominant in basic ye, this sense focuses on them to the more emphatic exclusion of the 
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‘motion’ aspects of the event – the Path and motion towards the Goal (IV-V). Example 37 is 
an exception as it describes the resultant state from the perspective of the immediately 
preceding ‘approach’ to the state – it is ‘nearly’ in a certain state. In all of the examples for 
this sense (except for 35) the perfective aspect emphasizes the perspective of the resultant 
state, as this aspect views a completed event whose effects or results are thus perceptually (in 
theory or in fact) available. 
 
The distinction, then, between metaphorical applications of the basic sense, and metaphorical 
extension to a separate sense (such as the sense currently being discussed), whilst subtle, 
appears to be necessary. It may also assist us to pinpoint the core semantic features of the 
basic sense, as it has been observed that verbs, when used metaphorically, are understood to 
refer to a general category of actions which can be epitomized by the metaphorically used 
verb (Glucksberg 2001:49 reporting on Torreano 1997). Accordingly, we may infer form this 
sense of ye that its original metaphorical extension (although now frozen) identified basic ye 
as being centrally defined by the quality which was emphasized in the metaphorical usage, 
namely, the arrival of the Figure at the Goal and its subsequent presence there (constituents 
VI-VII).  
 
Ye for existence/presence 
Ye can be used to mean that its (grammatical) subject is present somewhere: 
 
39 paN jewha te phaar waaDhatat tewhaa aamaashayaakaDehi war yetat. 
 but if they much increase-
prs-3pl 
then buttocks-to on come-prs-3pl 
But if there are too many [germs] then they are also on the buttocks. [MaNi:64; Vish] 
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I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-bad 
 
40 yeThaparyantachyaa sarwa shlokaant granThaant aalelyaa 
 there-up to-Poss all shloks-Loc treatise(m.)-Loc come-Perf. 
 
rogaanchii anukramaNikent dilii aahe. 
disease-about index-Loc give-pst-3pln be-prs-3s 
All of the diseases in these shlokas6 are given in the index. [MaNi:17; Vish] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ 
 
41 parantu to amukach prakaarachaa yeiil he nichshra-
yaane 
samajat naahii. 
 but that particular type-Poss come-
fut-3s 
this certain understand-
Prs.Part 
be-prs-
Neg 
But you can’t predict the particular type that it will be. [MaNi:18; Vish] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ 
 
Like the previously described sense (ye as a measure of physical extent or evaluative degree), 
this sense semantically focuses on the result of the motion event, which is the location of the 
Figure at the Goal (VII). In this way the primary mechanism of its extension from basic ye is 
constituent metonymy. However, it does differ from the previous sense in being even more 
heavily focused on this constituent. No other constituents receive any semantic weighting at 
all, in contrast to the previous sense where several of the examples retained some suggestion 
of the Path or arrival at the Goal (IV-VI). This is quite a significant semantic development 
because the verb effectively switches from being referentially ‘complex’ – encoding a series 
of continually shifting relations between the Figure and the Ground, to referentially ‘simple’ 
                                                
6 Shloks are Sanskrit verses characteristic of much of classical Indian writing. 
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– representing a single unchanging relationship between Figure and Ground (Kovecses 
2006:241-2 citing Taylor 2002). 
 
There is one other very prevalent situation wherein this sense of ye is used. That is when ye is 
used to express the presence of a wide range of physical and mental conditions. These usages 
are a slightly nuanced special case of the ‘existence/presence’ sense of ye, because in 
addition to a primary focus on the presence of the Figure at the Goal (VII) they do also retain 
some slight semantic orientation to the arrival of the Figure at the Goal (VI). Thus they do 
not shift quite so dramatically from a ‘complex’ to a ‘simple’ relationship expression as 
observed in the above examples (39-41). This is because the presence of a condition, so often 
a temporary state, is inescapably associated with the onset of the condition at some prior 
time. Nevertheless, native Marathi speakers overwhelmingly translated these examples as 
existential or stative type statements, only rarely using an inchoative English verb. 
 
 
42 aaLas yeNe 
 sluggishness come 
be/feel sluggish [MaNi:18] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-bad 
 
43 jwar yeNe 
 fever come 
have a fever [MaNi:18] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-bad 
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44 okaarii yeNe 
 vomit come 
vomit [MaNi:23] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
     ++ +++ /ye-bad 
 
45 phoDa yeNe 
 pimples come 
get pimples [MaNi:23] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
     + +++ /ye-bad 
 
46 chakkar yeNe 
 dizziness come 
feel dizzy [MaNi:23] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-bad 
 
47 ghaam yeNe 
 sweat come 
sweat [MaNi:23] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
     + +++ /ye-bad 
48 jhop phaar yeNe 
 sleepiness very come 
feel very sleepy [MaNi:24] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-bad 
 
49 paDase yeNe 
 common cold come 
have a cold [MaNi:24] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-bad 
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50 gandhii yeNe 
 boils come 
get boils [MaNi:25] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
     + +++ /ye-bad 
 
51 indriyaveikalya aale aahe 
 organ-broken state come-pst-3plf is-prs-3s 
the organs feel old [MaNi:40; Vish] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-bad 
 
52 tyaat mrutyu yeto    
 in that way, death come-prs-3sm    
thus [the patient; ‘he’] will/could die. [MaNi:30; Vish] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
     + +++ /ye-bad 
 
And so on. This is an extremely common sense of ye, especially in the context of bodily 
(including mental) functions: The primary data sources (Ayurveda books) contain at least a 
hundred different physical and mental states expressed using this sense of ye. Most of the 
examples hitherto have been of physical conditions; following are some of the mental ones 
that make use of the same sense of ye. 
 
53 manaatsii shaantii parat aalii. 
 mind-Poss. peace back come-pst-3sf. 
peace of mind returned. [Shr] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-good 
 
54 tasech dishaa kaal aadii goshTiichaa anubhaw aapaNaalaa yeto. 
 77 
 Thus space time principal-
(adj) 
matter(f.)-
Poss 
experience(m.) we-Dat come-
prs-
3sm 
Thus, we have experience of space and time as the chief constituents. [PaVi:67; Smit] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-good 
 
55 …jhaalyachii shankaa yete. 
 …become-pst-Poss doubt(f.) come-prs-1sf 
[the preceding] having happened there is doubt/we have doubt. [MaNi:48,54; Vish] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-bad 
 
This sense of ye is difficult to distinguish at times from a metaphorical application of ye’s 
basic sense because the interpretation of the word is dependent on the context and even more 
subjectively on the perspective that the addressee or reader decides to construe. Thus even in 
context the following (56 & 57) were claimed by the native Marathi translation assistant to 
be capable of meaning either of the two provided glosses: 
 
56 prasang yeNe 
 situation come 
to have a situation [PaVi:5; Shr] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ 
or: for a situation to arise 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
     ++ +++ 
 
57 baadhaa yeNe 
 obstacle come 
there are obstacles [PaVi:15; Shr] 
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I II III IVp V VI VII 
      +++ /ye-bad 
or: obstacles appear 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
     ++ +++ /ye-bad 
 
This lack of absolute determinacy suggests that ye may in fact simply be ‘general’ (cf. 
section 2.3) as regards its reference to ‘presence’ or ‘arrival’. (‘Arrival’ may be better 
substituted for other words in the English glosses such as ‘onset’, ‘appearance’ or 
‘occurrence’ depending on the particular example.) That is, in its most general basic 
definition ye could mean both ‘arrival’ and ‘presence’, but in a specific instance the same 
basic sense could refer more (or even only) to one or the other. The semantic range within the 
data and the native-speaker translations suggest that the most satisfactory explanation might 
be a continuum of semantic possibilities extending from the most clear-cut distinct sense-like 
examples (such as the first three exemplars provided for this ‘presence/existence’ sense of ye, 
example 39-41), through instances where the verb is more vague as to ‘presence’ or ‘arrival’ 
(such as these latter examples, 56 & 57; and the long list of symptom examples of the similar 
form ‘noun yeNe’, 42-55), to those that represent the most prototypical basic sense in that 
they definitely retain the fundamental motional quality of the verb by describing primarily 
‘arrival’ (such as many, although still not all, of the examples discussed for basic ye in 
section 3.2.3). Indeed, Goddard (2001:24) observes a cross-linguistic proclivity for “the word 
for ‘happen’ [to have] a secondary meaning approximating ‘appear’ or ‘arrive’”. The 
drawing of any demarking lines along this continuum is perhaps anyway futile in light of the 
ultimate interdependence of constituents VI (arrival of Figure at Source) and VII (presence of 
Figure at Source): If VI has occurred then VII also pertains, and if VII pertains then VI has at 
some point occurred.  
 79 
 
Ja as body part’s loss of power or normal functioning ability 
This sense of ja is, on the face of it, quite similar to the application of the metaphorical 
Figure praaN ‘life’ to ja as discussed above (examples 21 & 22). Loss of life is simply the 
whole person’s ‘loss of power or normal functioning ability’ (as opposed to just a single 
body part’s): 
 
58 bal wa varna he donhii jaatat. 
 power and skin this pair go-prs-3pl 
Power and skin both deteriorate. [MaNi:66; Vish] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
++ +++      /ja-bad 
 
59 hii baayko chaanglii paN kambarent gelii. 
 that woman good but waist/loins(f.) go-pst-3sf 
That woman is good but has some problem with her waist. [Mol:313; Vish] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
+++ ++      /ja-bad 
 
60 majhaa pay gelii 
 me-Poss legs go-pst-3pln 
My legs don’t work (have stopped working). [Vish] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
+++ ++      /ja-bad 
 
61 indriyaache bal gele aahe 
 organs-Poss. strength go-pst-3sn is-prs-3s 
power in the organs has gone. [MaNi:40] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
+++ ++      /ja-bad 
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One potential reason for identifying here a distinct sense of ja is the same as that provided for 
the ‘physical extent/evaluative degree’ sense of ye: That in most cases the Figure is a 
tangible object (varna ‘skin’, kambarent ‘waist/loins’, pay ‘legs’) and is therefore highly 
prototypical (in contrast to praaN ‘life’). As such any statement of its ‘going’ can only be 
interpreted as metaphorical and not literal motion, which we observed above (in ‘ye as 
physical extent or evaluative degree’) as being sufficiently semantically divergent from the 
basic sense to posit a separate sense. Furthermore, the present sense of ja may be used to 
describe the loss of power or function of the whole body, i.e. sharir jaaNe ‘to waste away’ 
(literally: for the body to go; [Mol:313]), which contrasts with praaN jaaNe ‘to die’ (literally: 
for life to go). 
 
This sense of ja is metonymically analogous to the two senses of ye already discussed. It 
focuses on the effect or the result of the event. Unlike for ye, however, the result of the event 
is not the existence of the Figure somewhere, but the opposite, the non-existence of the 
Figure somewhere, specifically, at the Source (see discussions in sections 2.2.1 & 3.2.2). But 
this observation frustrates the preceding claim that the Figures in examples 58 to 62 (for this 
sense of ja) are concrete physical objects. Because although literally (i.e. syntactically) the 
Figure is the (tangible) body or part thereof (e.g. majhaa pay gelii = literally ‘my legs went’), 
actually (i.e. integrating the semantic ‘facts’) the Figure is the abstract ‘power or normal 
functioning ability of the body or part thereof’ (i.e. majhaa pay gelii = ‘my legs stopped 
functioning’). So, after this abstract Figure ‘goes’ from its regular location (the Source; the 
body or part thereof) this sense of ja does not provide for the inclusion of any semantic 
information surrounding the subsequent Path or Goal (III-VII). Indeed, the only relevant (or 
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perhaps even, experientially accessible) information is that the Figure has departed from the 
Source and is henceforth no longer present there (I-II). 
 
To reiterate, two divergent interpretations are proposed above: The ‘literal’ (i.e. syntactic) 
interpretation wherein a prototypical (tangible object) Figure moves metaphorically 
(similarly to ye’s ‘physical extent/evaluative degree’ sense); and the ‘semantically integrated’ 
interpretation which looks more like a metaphorical application of basic ja as opposed to a 
distinct sense. In this second interpretation an abstract entity is metaphorically mapped onto 
the Figure which then ‘literally’ (as an abstract Figure) moves. Whereas the first 
interpretation sees a literal Figure moving figuratively. Whether we chose one or the other, 
however, does not alter the specific and marked metonymic process displayed, and hence 
even on the sole basis of this active mechanism the proposal of a distinct sense is justified. 
 
Another aspect of the body’s normal functioning ability is the mind’s normal functioning 
ability. This same sense of ja can also be used to describe the loss of such mental function. 
 
62 tyaachii buddhii gelii 
 he-Poss. sense go-pst-3sf 
He lost his mind / became stupid.7 [Shr] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
+++ ++      /ja-bad 
 
63 manaachii shaantii gelii (aahe). 
                                                
7 Interestingly, the converse of this statement cannot be expressed by replacing ye with ja, but instead by 
substituting chaal which in many contexts means the same as ja, i.e.‘go’:  
tyaatsii buddhi chaalalii 
his sense proceeded 
He thought smart. [Shr] 
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 mind-Poss. peace go-pst-3sf  (has) 
Lost peace of mind. [Shr] 
I II III IVp V VI VII 
+++       /ja-bad 
 
We have described four cases of meaning extension with respect to basic ja and ye: 
1. metaphorical applications of the basic senses (recall though that these are not 
extensions of basic ja and ye but extensions of meaning within the basic senses). 
2. Ye as a measure of physical extent or evaluative degree. 
3. Ye for existence/presence. 
4. Ja for the loss of function of the body or part thereof. 
 
Within these extensions we have witnessed both of the mechanisms (metaphor and 
metonymy) functioning, usually in combination with each other. More specifically, 
metonymy has functioned to focus on the results of the events, and a vast range of 
metaphorical mappings onto all elements of the basic motion event have been seen to 
effectively operate. We will now turn to a discussion of the possible causes for these 
semantic shifts. 
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 3.3.3 Causes 
The operation of ‘result metonymy’ in all of the extended senses is causally interpretable in 
terms of subjectivity. That is, these shifts are the outcome of innovation tending (or being 
‘attracted’) towards meanings which are more subjective. Metonymic selection of the ‘result’ 
constituents fits with a subjective explanation because with both ja and ye it is these 
constituents which most directly relate to the deictic centre – generally the speaker. This is 
because the Ground orientation of the verbs (the Goal for ye, and variable according to 
syntactic context for ja, but normally predominantly the Source and/or Goal) is often tied to a 
subjectively located deictic centre – especially so for ye which is strongly deictically imbued. 
Note that this ‘subjectivity’, like the deictic centre, can be ‘projected’ to express the 
perspective of someone other than the speaker, such as the penultimate example above (62: 
tyachii buddhii gelii ‘his common sense abandoned him’), where the Source of gelii ‘went’ is 
the subject of the narrative to ‘him’. This is what Traugott and Dasher (2002) call 
intersubjectivity, various peoples’ subjectivities relating with each other. 
 
Result metonymy in the case of motion verbs also has a possible cognitive basis suggested in 
experimental results showing that “our memory for the spatial location of an object is biased 
in the direction of the object’s motion, even when the object is presented statically” (Gibbs 
2006:56 citing Freyd & Finke 1984). The experiments demonstrated that when presented 
with a still image of a moving object we tend to ‘remember’ the object’s location as being 
further in the direction that it was depicted to be moving. This is called ‘representational 
momentum’. Combined with the findings presented above on the conceptual and linguistic 
integration of the literal and the figurative (section 2.3.1.1; Glucksberg 2001, Coulson & 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2005), there is every reason to assume that this phenomenon of 
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representational momentum – even after multiple and various metaphorical applications 
within the ‘literal’ motion event – could be accessed, adapted and adopted into the 
metaphorized motion event.  
 
Turning now to the other posited cause of semantic change, the twin efficiency/expression 
imperative. The fact that the three extended senses of ja and ye have become 
conventionalized sufficiently attests to their general communicative efficiency (i.e. if it didn’t 
work then it wouldn’t catch on). Briefly, though, the result metonymy is efficient in that it 
selects only the most significant part of the motion event for semantic focus. The other 
constituents, being less essential in terms of the particular communicative motivation (i.e. 
what needs, in this case, to be expressed), are de-emphasized. This point could actually be 
restated in terms of subjectivity and the need/desire for expressivity: ‘What needs to be 
expressed’ requires someone’s subjective perspective to integrate the communicative 
demands of the situation with their own personal communicative needs/desires (cf. Traugott 
& Dasher 2002 on subjectivization in modal verbs). In the case of ja and ye, their result 
constituents (departure from or arrival at a location) also happen to be central in their 
respective basic meanings. Thus, their ‘result metonymy’ is also ‘core-constituent 
metonymy’. This kind of metonymic selection is semantically efficient because it maintains, 
via a core constituent, a relatively simple and transparent relationship to the (more broadly 
conceived) basic motion event. This argument for the ‘efficiency’ of result/core-constituent 
metonymy is further supported – although only for ye – by the ‘representational momentum’ 
phenomenon discussed above; this kind of metonymy in ye is a semantic shift towards the 
same part (constituents) of the basic motion event as ‘representational momentum’ 
concentrates on. 
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Looking now at the expressive requirement as a cause of semantic shift we might consider 
some of the underlying cultural tendencies which led to the development of these particular 
semantic forms. Many of the usages of the extended senses can be seen to be in the broad 
domain of physical and mental health (and illness). Of course this is a reflection of the major 
data sources (Ayurveda books), but it may also suggest a cultural-internal tendency to use 
inchoative verbs in this particular domain. Inchoative verbs inherently express temporal flux, 
as well as ‘complex’ rather than ‘simple’ relationships between parts (see discussion in ‘ye 
for existence/presence’; Kovecses 2006:241-2). This linguistic pattern then, expresses 
peoples’ physical and mental states as processes rather than static relationships.  
 
This pattern could reflect an underlying CYCLE  image schema which is variously manifested 
in sub-continental culture and cosmology, such as in cyclical conceptions of time (Hoyt 
1994, e.g. belief in a continual cycle of birth and rebirth), and is hence not surprisingly found 
expressed in their language. The CYCLE image schema relates to the BALANCE image schema 
(Gibbs 2006:93-4, 103), also highly significant in the Indian conception of health and healing 
– health is defined as a balance of the three vital bodily humours (dosha), and illness is their 
imbalance (Kirmayer 2004). The recurrent process of the body (or mind or universe or 
anything) coming and going in and out of balance is distinctly cyclical. Things (Figures) 
‘coming’ and ‘going’ to and from a person (Source/Goal), it appears, determines health (or 
lack of it). It is precisely the same notion of adding or subtracting things from a system which 
will either balance it or imbalance it. Thus we can see the conception of human CYCLES of 
BALANCE and imBALANCE displayed in the linguistic tendency of using verbs of motion (ja 
and ye) to describe human states and conditions.  
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Motion verbs also have a broad cross-linguistic tendency to describe ‘self-volitional’ events, 
thus largely excluding external agents (Croft 1990:61). This could be interpreted in two 
contrastive ways: (1) such events are the actions of discrete and autonomous entities, acting 
according to their own internal and isolable motivations, or (2) such events are ‘natural’ 
occurrences which do not require external agents but which simply happen of their own 
accord. Interpretation (1) is clearly more suited to prototypical instances of the basic senses 
of ja and ye, where the Figure is a person and hence (at least by my intuitive/conditioned 
understanding) capable of having their own internal motivations. For many of the examples 
illustrating extended uses/senses, however, I suggest that more metaphorical Figures (such as 
abstract concepts) do not possess such a capability, and so interpretation (2) must be 
favoured. This suggests a conception of health and illness as being internally regulated, 
which is confirmed by ethnographically supported claims that Ayurveda is an ‘internalizing’ 
medical system (Kirmayer 2004). ‘Internalizing’ systems view health and illness as being the 
result of internal states and processes. In the case of Ayurveda this is also linguistically 
expressed in the polysemous word dosha, which refers to the bodily humors but also just 
means ‘illness’. In other words, illness is just you, but in a different form (specifically, an 
imbalanced form, as earlier discussed). We can thus observe the (independently attested) 
internalizing conception of health and illness linguistically manifested in the widespread use 
in this domain of motion verbs which do not have (nor require) external causative factors.  
 
This contrasts with the tendency in English of a linguistically implied separation between 
patient and illness, e.g. ‘he has an illness’, ‘she suffers from an illness’. This contrast is 
reflected in the more thorough integration of personal, social and environmental factors into 
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the Indian conception of health and illness, in terms of causes, processes and treatments as 
compared to the Western model (Warner 1976).   
 
Finally, we may posit that subjectivity, especially perhaps in its outsourced manifestations 
like deictic projection, is underlyingly structured by the CENTER-PERIPHERY image schema 
(Gibbs 2006:91). Based on our embodied understanding of ourselves as, literally, the centre 
of our universe with all else happening around us, we can project the model and place 
another person at the CENTER and then organise everything else with respect to them, at their 
PERIPHERY.  
 
We cannot here speculate any further on the specifics of the language-culture 
interrelationships that the above observations might reveal; more ethnographic inquiry would 
be required. But the findings presented here could certainly be valuable in supplying the 
linguistic data of possible anthropological linguistic research in this area.  
 
 
3.4 ‘Figurative’ deixis in ja and ye  
Finally, before wrapping up this chapter, we will return to the idea of figurative deixis which 
has featured in several cross-linguistic analyses of COME and GO (section 2.2.3). The general 
hypothesis is that if the deictic centre is projected into the abstract realm it will be ‘located’ 
at (broadly) ‘good’. Due to this, uses or senses of COME which incorporate metaphorized 
elements involve motion towards or arrival at this figurative deictic centre. GO, in part 
deictically characterized in terms of opposition to COME’s primary deictic property, involves 
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departure or motion away from the figurative deictic centre ‘good’. Do the Marathi data 
confirm the hypothesis? 
 
The general answer is yes, they do. We will discuss some qualifications to this affirmative 
answer, but firstly, some examples which support the premise: 
 
• COME/ye = ‘good’ 
 
64 malaa lakshaat yete. 
 me-Dat attention(n.)-Loc come-prs-3sn 
I get it (know/understand how to do it). [Ashi] 
 
65 maajhaa dhyaanaat yete tuu 
 me-Poss attention(n.)-Loc. come-3sn you 
I remember you [Smit] 
 
66 mi janmaat aalo. 
 I existence-Loc come-pst-1sm 
I was born. [Shr] 
 
67 mi srimantiit aalo.     
 I richness-loc come-pst-1sm.     
I became rich. [Shr] 
 
68 tiche pot aale ahe.    
 she-Poss. stomach come-pst-3sf is-prs-3s    
She is pregnant [Vish] 
 
69 mhanaje suuj kamii yeiil   
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 means swelling less come-fut-3s   
That will relieve you of swelling. [Ajit] 
 
70 nusatyaa aushadhaane tyaas gun yeNe shakya naahii. 
 just medicine-Inst those benefit(m.) come-Inf feasible be-prs-Neg 
They are difficult to cure with only medicine. [MaNi:43; Vish] 
 
• GO/ja = ‘bad’ 
 
71 panchatvaalaa jaaNe 
 death-Loc go-inf 
to die. [PaVi:114] 
 
72 …rogyaachaa shabd khol jaato.   
 patient(m.)-Poss. voice(m.) deep go-prs-3sm   
the patient’s voice becomes (Lit: goes) low/deep.  [MaNi:97] 
 
73 aawaaj waadhat jaaNe     
 voice high go-Inf.     
The voice becomes high [Vish] 
 
74 aang waaLat jaaNe 
 body dry go-Inf. 
 The body becomes dry. [MaNi:31] 
 
75 to khuup presharamadhun gela.  
 he much pressure-under go-pst-3sm  
He was under a lot of pressure. [Smit] 
 
76 nikaal tyaachyaa viruddh gelaa.  
 verdict(m.) he-Poss against go-pst-3sm  
The verdict went against him. [Oxf:326] 
 90 
 
There are many examples which also seem, on the face of it, to contradict the hypothesis. 
However, upon closer inspection these are overwhelmingly descriptions of conditions – 
either internal (personal) or external (general circumstances) which have become 
metaphorical Figures and then either ‘come’ (i.e. happen or persist) or ‘go’ (i.e. cease or 
desist). Obviously, whether some abstract Figure’s ‘coming’ or ‘going’ (i.e. is present or 
absent) is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depends entirely on the nature of the abstract Figure. For instance, 
money (paisa) or energy (both human [shaktii] and electrical [elektrisitii]) can ‘come’ 
(=‘good’) and ‘go’ (=‘bad’) in Marathi. But this does not imply a ‘good’ deictic centre 
because fever (taap) and anger (raag) can also ‘come’ (=‘bad’) and ‘go’ (=‘good’).  
 
Similarly, recall the list of physical symptoms exemplifying the ‘existence/presence’ sense 
ye. All are clearly ‘bad’, but this profusion of ye=‘bad’ examples does not necessarily 
indicate that there is a ye=‘bad’ semantic tendency in Marathi. Rather, it is just as likely a 
reflection of a bias in the data due to the fact of one of the main sources being a physician’s 
diagnostic manual. Accordingly, we can also find examples of ‘good’ conditions ‘coming’ 
which hence could be claimed to bear out the “‘good’ deictic centre” hypothesis (these are 
repeated from section 3.3.2): 
 
77 manaachii shaantii parat aalii. 
 mind-Poss. peace back come-pst-3sf. 
peace of mind returned. [Shr] 
 
78 tasech dishaa kaal aadii goshTiichaa anubhav aapaNaalaa yeto. 
 Thus space time principal- matter(f.)- experience(m.) we-Dat come-
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(adj) Poss prs-3sm 
Thus, we have experience of space and time as the chief constituents. [PaVi:67; Smit] 
 
The point is that these examples where a metaphorical Figure ‘comes’ or ‘goes’ should not 
be taken to either support or refute the hypothesis.  
 
Before leaving this point, let us follow the ‘symptom’+yeNe examplar full circle. The lack of 
or cessation (‘departure’) of the symptom or condition can sometimes (but not always) be 
expressed simply by substituting ja, e.g.: 
 
79 phoD jaaNe 
 pimples go-Inf. 
to stop having pimples [Vish]  
 
My informant explained that ja can be used when the condition is a drawn-out one that 
occurs gradually and over a long period of time. Conditions that ‘come’ on suddenly will, in 
Marathi, ‘ye’, but cannot then ‘ja’. Instead, they can be semantically inverted with kamii ye 
‘come less’: 
 
80 mhanaje suuj kamii yeiil 
 means swelling less come-fut-3s 
That will relieve you of swelling. [Ajit] 
 
This turn of phrase, notice, slots back in to the hypothesized frame – COME/ye = ‘good’, as 
does its contrastive ja counterpart (below), where the ‘condition’ (vyaadhiawasthaa) ‘going 
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less’ (kamii hot jaaNe) is clearly a ‘bad’ thing as it is cited as the ‘main cause’ of the 
subsequent digestion problem: 
81 tyaamuLe vyaadhiawasThaa kamii hot jaaNe mhaNajech doshaanchaa 
 accordingly condition(f.) less become-
Prs.Part 
go-Inf means problem-Poss? 
 
paak ghaDuun yet chaalalaa aahe, 
digestion(m.) happen-Conj.Part come-Prs.Part proceed-pst-3sm be-3s 
If the condition is easing, then that’s the main cause of the digestive problem [PaVi:49; Smit] 
 
Thus we have seen a certain (although admittedly not compelling) amount of supportive 
evidence for the proposed “‘good’ deictic center” hypothesis. It was suggested in section 2.3 
that ‘ameliorative’ and ‘pejorative’ change may be a systematic part of COME and GO’s 
semantic development, as witnessed in the hitherto discovered cross-linguistic pervasiness of 
the COME = ‘good’ / GO = ‘bad’ dyad (Sinha 1972, Clarke 1974, Treerat 1990). This claim 
can now be buttressed with the Marathi evidence, but more fundamentally, with the semantic 
‘attractor’ of subjectification: To place the deictic centre at (the figurative location) ‘good’ is 
patently to align one’s own perspective with one’s own preferred situation. Thus subjectivity, 
which has already been so influential in the analysis, further consolidates its value as a causal 
explanation of semantic change in ja and ye. 
 
Unfortunately, we have not had the benefit of a more exhaustive range of data nor of 
sufficient access to (or possession of) native-speaker intuition to decisively confirm (or 
disconfirm) Marathi’s concordance with the “‘good’ deictic centre” hypothesis. We have 
presented some evidence suggesting concordance, and made some useful observations about 
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the phenomena from the Marathi perspective, but ultimately we must recommend that future 
work is still required on this topic. 
 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Before wrapping up this chapter we will briefly consider some of the general implications of 
the findings.  
 
Firstly, and in agreement with Traugott and Dasher (2002:29), the findings indicate that 
“conceptual metonymy needs to be expanded to account for subjectification”. In the context 
of the metonymic extensions of ja and ye and their subjectivity-based causes, we observed 
numerous significant interrelationships between the two concepts. 
 
The array of metaphorical applications to the basic senses, and at the same time of distinct 
metaphorically extended senses, can be understood with reference to the property of ‘dual 
reference’. Broadly characteristic of metaphor usage and understanding, ‘dual reference’ 
allows multiple senses and applications of words to be simultaneously (cognitively and 
linguistically) ‘active’, allowing them all ‘online’ access to each other’s semantic attributes 
(Glucksberg 2001:50, Israel 2005:155). This remarkable aspect of our linguistic faculties 
explains the ease with which we manage the dynamic continuum of literal-figurative 
meaning discussed in section 2.3.1.1. With regards to the dominant semantic domain of the 
data in this study (health, illness, healing), Kirmayer (2004) has found that the efficacy of 
many traditional healing practices relies on the mutually reinforcing effect of synchronically 
interpreted multiple levels of meaning (literal and figurative). In this study we have observed 
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ja and ye expressing a variety of literal and figurative meanings. This variety of levels of 
meaning may actually be functionally contributing to the discourses of healing that they are a 
part of (cf. Kirmayer 2004:42). 
 
One final area which we do not have the space to cover, but will mention briefly, is the 
syntactic applications of ja and ye. Both ja and ye have a number of grammaticalized forms 
and functions, and within these they exhibits many of the same mechanisms and causal 
motivations that have been discussed with regards to their lexical manifestations. I would 
identify the integration of grammaticalized forms into regular studies of semantic shift as 
another area for future research in this field and language (cf. Robert 2008; Traugott & 
Dasher 2002; Heine & Kuteva 2002). 
 
 
3.6 Summary 
• The basic senses of ja and ye are similar in meaning, although not identical, to English go 
and come.  
• Both crucially involve (i) movement, and (ii) implicit or explicit reference to one or more 
locations (Source and/or Goal). 
• Ye is generally Goal oriented. The Goal is deictically referenced by the verb and is often 
subjectively (speaker) oriented but can be quite freely projected. 
• Ja’s deictic properties are less explicit but also tend to be subjectively deictically 
referential. The Goal or Source orientation of ja depends on grammatically invited inference. 
• Grammatically invited inference is also capable of generating many more general 
semantic variations with the basic senses. 
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• Extensions of meaning occur both within the basic senses by metaphorization, and also 
from them by associated mechanisms of metaphorization and metonymization. 
• At least two distinct senses of ye and one of ja can be distinguished, although their 
classification is not unproblematic. 
• The ‘result/core-constituent’ metonymic effect is largely a semantic shift towards (the 
‘attractor’ of) subjectivity. 
• Efficiency is also a subjectivity-grounded cause of semantic change. 
• Expressivity as a cause illuminated some cognitive (image schemas) influences, and 
suggested some language-culture connections worthy of further investigation. 
• Ja and ye conform to the “‘good’ deictic centre” hypothesis, although more evidence 
would strengthen this finding. 
• The plasticity and flexibility of meaning, both inherently and in the context of language 
and our linguistic faculties, is fundamentally responsible for the variation observed in ja and 
ye, but remains far from fully understood. 
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Chapter Four: Conclusions 
 
COME and GO are widespread but neither universal nor semantically primitive. As such there 
is still much new and interesting ground to cover regarding their special properties of 
meaning, both basic and extended, and within individual languages and cross-linguistically. 
 
Deixis is an inherent feature of language. Moreover, it is inherently complicating in its dual 
influence in more structural aspects of language, and more applied areas like semantics and 
pragmatics. But also, it simulataneously simplifies communicative practice thanks to its 
directly referential capacity. As such we can observe deixis as attending all at once to our 
inclination to subjectivity (the default deictic center me, here, now), as well as to our 
requirements for communicative efficiency and expressivity. Deixis plays a key role in the 
meanings and uses of both basic and extended ja and ye, and more broadly of GO and COME. 
The extension of GO and COME’s deictic properties from the ‘literal’ to the ‘figurative’ realm 
eloquently exemplifies the interplay of literal and figurative meaning. 
 
Polysemy provides powerful theoretical tools for the explanation of a particular type of 
semantic change – where a single lexical item develops multiple senses. One of its primary 
mechanisms, metaphor, taps into the creative capacity of language (and people) to 
manipulate the dynamic (literal/figurative) potential of meaning. Underlying metaphor we 
can detect (through empirical means such as language) cognitive models called image 
schemas which structure our construal of the world in all its concreteness and abstractness. 
Image schemas can illuminate linkages between language, cognition and culture, but 
ultimately they are theoretical tools that empirically can neither be proven nor disproven. 
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Another of polysemy’s main mechanisms, metonymy, is underpinned by forces both personal 
(subjectivity) and interpersonal (efficiency/expression, intersubjectivity). These semantic 
‘attractors’ allow us to perceive a degree of regularity within a diversity of semantic change, 
including in that of ja and ye. Prototypicality provides yet another organizational model for 
the multiple complex structures and processes involved in semantic change. 
 
Distinguishing polysemous senses (as with semantic theory in general) is fraught with 
theoretical and practical difficulties, ruling out any possible claims of absolute or exclusive 
‘truth’. The best we can hope for is what has been achieved here for ja and ye, namely a 
“redescription of semantic phenomena which classifies them according to a transparent and 
obvious – though not necessary or objective – set of criteria” (Riemer 2005:418-9). A 
principled investigative procedure was established and applied to the data, yielding a 
coherent account of the semantic ‘facts’ as witnessed in the actual usage of ja and ye. 
 
All told, the theoretical examination and semantic analysis of ja and ye provided here suggest 
that the current linguistic paradigms for the study of motion verbs are inadequate. In too 
often focusing on one or other of the theoretical perspectives they over-simplify what is 
actually a complex interplay between various aspects of coinciding fields: The various 
cognitive, social and linguistic influences subsumed within semantic change towards 
polysemy, deixis, the language and conception of space, but to name a few. Also, much 
research on motion verbs is grounded in ‘localist’ hypotheses of the primacy of space, and 
branches out from there to the (apparently) less directly graspable figurative and 
metaphorical realms of language and meaning. In this respect it assumes rather than directly 
addresses some of the deeper perceptual and theoretical questions surrounding space, 
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cognition and language, and fails to provide a truly functional explanation that draws 
together our experiential reality and the subjective and intersubjective processes of creating 
and using ‘meaning’. It is in this direction that I hope future excursions into the language of 
motion verbs will move. 
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